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ABSTRACT
Probabilistic Framework For Balancing Smart Grid’s Performance Enhancement
And Resilience To Cyber Threat
Rezoan Ahmed Shuvro, B.S., M.S.
Marquette University, 2020
Critical infrastructures such as smart grids rely heavily on the seamless
interaction between the grid subcomponents, i.e., the communication networks
which transfers information from and to the grid, and the human operators/AI
agents for taking necessary control actions. Smart grids are prone to cascading
failures, which trigger from a few initial the tripping of a few transmission lines or
generators, creating a ripple effect in the entire network, which may, in turn, lead
to a total blackout. Having additional information through the communication
network increases the probability of taking better control actions (e.g., effective
load shedding and other protection mechanisms), which increases the reliability of
the grid. On the other hand, enhancing the smart grid’s communication capability
increases the risk of harm through cyberattack and other faults in the communication network. A fundamental question is how can we balance the trade-off between
grid’s performance enhancement and robustness to information infidelity? In this
dissertation, we develop a predictive analytic, scalable and tractable Markov-chain
model for cascading failures in smart grids including the role of the human operators, while taking into account the benefits and harm of the communication
network (e.g., supervisory control and data acquisition). The state transition
probabilities of the Markov chain captures the benefits and added vulnerabilities
resulting from the communication network. A detailed mapping between powergrid states and the operators’ response has been established that allows capturing
a wide range of operator behavior and their probabilities into in the dynamics
of the Markov chain. The model shows the existence of a point of diminishing
returns beyond which the harm of cyber threat and human errors outweighs the
benefits of having information. An optimal level of inter-connectivity is achieved
between the power grid and the communication network minimizing the expected
value of the transmission-line failures.
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Executive Summary
Smart grids rely extensively on communication and sensing to provide informational data so that it operates reliably. As such, the reliability of the smart
grid is heavily dependent on the interdependence between power grid components
and its associated communication and control networks. The interdependency
with a communication network is an inherent attribute of smart grids, as they
require seamless integration of traditional power-plants, distributed energy resources (DERs) such as wind farms, solar, and micro-grids, as well as operation
and management systems. For example, degradation in the communication and
control networks, resulting from a cyberattack, will impact the ability to prevent or
slow-down successive grid-component failures (such as transmission line failures),
namely, cascading failures in the power grid which often results in blackouts. Conversely, power outages can lead to degradation in the communication and control
networks, which, in turn, can further exacerbate the transmission-line and generator failures in the power grid. Additionally, human operators play an important
role in smart grid operation and reliability, and they introduce a new level of
interdependency between the power grid and the communication and control networks through their actions in controlling the grid using the information provided
by the communication network. The system operators’ expertise in dealing with
cascading failures can play a pivotal role during contingencies. For instance, as
the communication and control capabilities are degraded as a result of a cyber
attack, cascading failures in power grids may ensue, which altogether can create
a stressful and intense environment for the operators. This, in turn, increases the
probability of operator errors as they diagnose and implement corrective actions
(for example, through load shedding), which will further exacerbate cascading
failures in the smart grid. Hence, understanding the impact of the dependence
on information on the operation of the smart grid, both negative and positive, of
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information-centric smart grids is critical in predicting the reliability of the smart
grid.
There have been notable efforts on modeling the cascading-failure dynamics
in smart grids. Here we will mention the most relevant works. Buldyrev et al. was
the first to introduce the detrimental effects of interdependency and reported that
failures in one system could collapse the entire interdependent system and lead to
a blackout. Rahnamay-Naeini and Hayat used two interdependent Markov chains
(for the power grid and communication networks) to capture the harm of interdependency. In their work, state-space reduction of the complex interactions of the
power grid and communication components was achieved by choosing the state
variables of the Markov chain inspired by observations made through simulations.
Wang et al. modeled the effect of human error on the reliability of smart grids
using performance attributes such as time to react and stress level of operators.
Korkali et al. showed that cascading-failure risk could be reduced by increasing
infrastructure network interdependence, i.e., increasing the interdependency between power grids and communication networks. However, the role of cyber threat
on the reliability of communication was not captured, i.e., the harmful effect of
communication was not considered. Hence, a comprehensive model capturing the
benefits and harms of communication, including the role of human error in the
loop has not been studied. This is a crucial driver for this dissertation.
In this dissertation, a stochastic Markov-chain model, namely, Interdependent Stochastic Abstract State Space Evolution (I-SASE), is developed, which
captures the dynamics of cascading failures in the power grid and the benefits and
risks of information through the communication network. To do this, a previously
developed Markov-chain model is generalized to capture the trade-off between the
benefits of having a robust communication infrastructure and its vulnerability to
cyberattacks. The impact of error probability of system operators’ as they take

iv

actions to mitigate cascading failures is incorporated into the model as a function
of the state variables of the Markov chain. The model shows that there exists a
point of diminishing return beyond which the effect of cyber threat and human
errors outweighs the benefits of having more information. This is one of the critical contributions of the model. An optimal level of interdependency minimizing
the expected value of transmission-line failures is achieved between the power grid
and the communication network.
The benefits of the I-SASE model are threefold. First, the model captures
the interdependency and dynamic interactions between the layers of the power
grid, which is more realistic compared to the current literature that does not
include the effect of cyber threat in an analytical model. Second, the model incorporates the benefits of having inter-connectivity with a communication network
through effective implementation of load shedding. Meanwhile, the model captures the harm of having excessive information through cyber threats in addition
to system operator error. Our formulation of this model, therefore, leads to finding an optimal level of inter-connectivity that maximizes the benefits rendered
by information, for a given level of cyber threat and operator error. Third, the
model produces the probability distribution of the size of a blackout analytically,
considering the potential harm from cyber threat and operator error.
The I-SASE model is analytic, scalable, and tractable. It can be beneficial
for the smart grid utilities in their design process to minimize the harm rendered
by cyber threats through communication infrastructure to make the smart grid
robust in the face of cyberattacks. Moreover, smart grid operators can use this
model to design optimal decision strategies to mitigate cascading failures while
maximizing the number of customers served. The model variables and parameters
can be easily scaled to apply this model in other interdependent networks such as
the transportation networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Motivation

The North-American electric grid is one of the greatest engineering marvels of
the current age and is one of the biggest connected network consisting of three
sub-units: the generating units, the transmission network, and the distribution
units. A basic structure of the electric grid components can be visualized from
Figure 1.1. Transmission lines distribute power from generating units to the customers. The operation of modern power grids (i.e., smart grids) is a prime example
of a coupled interdependent system, with highly interdependent subsystems: the
power-grid, the communication network, operation, and the management systems.
Grid operation relies heavily on the communication network for monitoring and
control, while human operators remain key elements in reliable operations of these
systems [9]. The technological advancements in computer-based communication
networks made it indispensable to use the developments in communication to make
the power grid more intelligent. Communication networks in smart grids play an
important role in the reliability of power delivery. Due to the complex nature of
the operation, power grids are prone to large outages initiated from small disturbances referred to as cascading failures [10] that often lead to a partial or complete

Figure 1.1: Basic structure of the electric grid [3]
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blackout of the grid. Cascading failure in the power grid is defined as a sequence of
correlated failures of individual components that successively weakens the power
system [11]. Cascading failures can be triggered by a wide range of events, including natural disasters, technical error, human error, and intentional sabotage
attacks [12]. The triggers to massive blackouts (due to cascading failures in the
transmission grid) are many, including natural disturbances (ice storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, and earthquakes) as well as non-natural events such as human
errors, equipment failures, cyber-attacks, weapons of mass destructions (WMDs),
High altitude Electro-Magnetic Pulses (HEMP), sabotages, and supply shortages
[13, 12]. When the grid is stressed as a result of failures due to natural disasters and attacks, successive failures (in power grid and communication network)
may propagate within and across these networks leading to large-scale cascadingfailures and blackouts. Failures in the power grid can affect the communication
network, which in turn, may affect the power grid, and so on. Further, failures
in the power grid can lead to failures in the communication and control network
and create a stressful environment (with the high possibility of human errors)
to react to the situation and implement corrective actions, which can exacerbate
failures in the grid. Besides, as smart grids move toward becoming progressively
more distributed and information-centric, the concern over cyber-security threats
becomes increasingly alarming. With the advent of smart grids and the integration of complicated communication networks, the number of massive blackouts is
occurring more frequently than before. A list of top ten power grid outages due to
cascading failures are shown in Table 1.1. The number of people getting affected
by these events and the economic loss is astronomical. From 1965 to 2008, nine
massive blackout events were affecting more than 20 million people, whereas, in
the last decade, there were seven massive blackouts, including the largest one in
India [2].
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Table 1.1: Top 10 power grid outages due to cascading failures in the world [2]
Location
India
India
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Indonesia
Indonesia
Brazil
Brazil, Paraguay
Italy, Switzerland
United States, Canada

People affected (millions)
620
230
150
140
2019
2009
1999
60
56
55

Year
2012
2001
2014
2015
120
100
97
2009
2003
2003

An overview of the cascading failures was depicted in Figure 1.2. In summary,
the Figure shows that there is a list of power grid operating parameters that control the grid behavior. On top of that, there are interdependencies between the
power grid layers, such as power-communication interdependency, power-human
interdependency, and so forth. With an initial trigger (for example, transmissionline failures) resulting from a natural disaster or intentional/unintentional initial
event, there can be a series of events leading to cascading failures. Human operators are an essential component of the smart-grid, and they introduce a new level
of interdependency between the power grid and the communication and control
networks. Due to the complexity of the network, statistical measures such as the
distribution of line failures are extremely complicated to find, and in this dissertation out prime goal would be to model the interdependencies in smart grids using
a Markov-chain based model and then predict the nature of cascading failures in
the power grid from the initial conditions of the grid during cascade initiation.
1.2 Examples of large blackouts and known causes

Historical data of the power grid failures suggest that various factors related
to these elements can affect the efficient operation of the power grids and contribute to cascading-failure. Various factors related to the elements of the smart
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Figure 1.2: Overview of the cascading failure dynamics in power grids.
grid can affect the efficient operation of the grid and contribute to cascading failures. For example, the 2003 Northeast blackout in the United States and Canada
occurred due to a combination of transmission-line and generating-unit failures,
communication component and server failures, as well as ineffective and erroneous
human-operator responses as observed in Figure 1.3 taken from the postmortem
report by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) on 2003
cascading failures event [3]. Specifically, the alarm software failed, leaving the human operators unaware of the transmission-line outage, which contributed to the
cascading-failure [14]. After the initial trigger of failure in the transmission-line
due to a combined impact of power grid and communication system disturbances,
cascading-failure evolved in phases throughout the power grid network (as seen
from Figure 1.4) and resulted in more than 55 GW’s of power failure [4]. Figure
1.4 shows the three phases of the cascading failures namely, precursor phase, escalation phase and the cascade phase-out phase [1]. Similar evolution of cascading
failure phases was also observed in July 1996 and August 1996 in the Western
Interconnection [5] as shown in Figure 1.5.
The power blackout in Italy of 2003 is another example of power grid and
communication network interdependency where an unplanned power shutdown
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Figure 1.3: Timeline of the events leading to the start of cascading failures [3].
eventually led failures in the communication network, which in turn initiated a
series of cascading-failures in the power grid [15].
According to the NERC report, the 2011 southwest blackout in the USA was
caused due to human error and poor planning, which affected more than 2.7 million customers [16]. In 2015, massive power outages due to a cyber-attack were
observed in Ukraine (affecting 225,000 customers), which used the false-data injection and led to cascading failures [17].
As the power grid becomes smarter through sophisticated sensing, communication, and control, the combination of the communication-network security, the
intelligent subsystems used to control the grid, and human operators will play
a pivotal role in the reliability and robustness of the power grid. Smart grids
rely heavily on communication networks for monitoring and control, while human
operators play a crucial role in the reliable operations of these systems [9]. Statistical analysis on outage data shows that among all the outage events between
1984-2006, 10.1% power grid outage events were caused by operator error [12].
Hence, these real-world examples suggest that the communication network
and human operators’ play pivotal roles in the reliability and robustness of the
power grid. The given real-world examples indicate that it is of great importance
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Figure 1.4: Real time rate of cascading-failure for the 2003 Northeast blackout [4].
to study the interdependencies among these coupled systems to understand the
role of such interdependencies so that cascading-failures can be prevented before
massive blackouts.
1.3 Literature review

In this section, we review the works related to this dissertation. Besides, we
also point out the limitations of these works and briefly describe the contributions
of this dissertation where necessary. There have been extensive works on modeling
cascading failure in the power grid. Efforts can be categorized in mainly in three
approaches: (i) network/graph-theoretic approaches (including complex-system
theory) [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28] , (ii) power-system simulations
[29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 23, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 30, 41, 42, 43] (iii) probabilistic
analytical models [29, 31, 7, 5, 44, 45, 46, 47, 41, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53].
Probabilistic analytical models usually use concepts from branching processes,
regeneration theory, percolation theory, or Markov chains to model the stochasticfailure dynamics in the power grid. Probabilistic models on cascading failures
[13] in the power grids focus on both failure dynamics in the power grid in a
single, non-interacting environment or considering the interdependence between
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Figure 1.5: Real-time rate of cascading failure for the 1996 blackout [5].
the power grid and the communication network.
One general weakness in all the prior works is the insufficient treatment of the
realistic functional interdependency among cyber threats, human factors, and the
power grid. The prime focus of this study is to address both the benefits and harm
of interdependence of the communication network and find a balance between the
smart grid’s performance enhancement and resilience to the cyber threat.
1.3.1

Prior works on modeling cascading failures in smart grids

Cascading failure dynamics involve several power-grid variables and interdependency between power grid and communication system variables [7, 30], modeling cascading failures, and analyzing the severity of cascading failure is a challenging task. Nonetheless, since the 2003 blackout in North America [54], significant
research efforts have regarded models of cascading failure dynamics in power grids
and strategies to understand and mitigate the risk of cascading failures [13]. A
common approach is to use of probabilistic modeling of cascading failures in the
power grid either as an independent system [32, 5, 55] or in the presence of an
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interdependent system environment [44, 30, 21, 7] (e.g., the interdependency between the power grid and communication system). Cascading failure analysis
tools, guidelines, and metrics are reported by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) cascading failure working group in [11, 56, 57, 58].
A Markov-chain driven probabilistic model named stochastic abstract state
evolution (SASE) was proposed in [5] that captures the dynamics of cascading
failures in a power grid using a reduced state space. The notion of an equivalent
class in [5] allows modeling the large state space of the power grid with infinitely
many variables by using a small equivalent reduced state space. More recently,
in the human-SASE (hSASE) model [1], the authors considered an additional
state-variable to capture the effect of human operator errors on the power grid
dynamics. Both the SASE and hSASE models are capable of determining the
distribution of transmission-line failures and evaluating the blackout size at steadystate. In [59], a data-driven parametric model is proposed to characterize the
dynamics of the propagation of transmission-line failures of the power grid. This
model can estimate the total capacity loss due to the failure of transmission lines
numerically during cascading failures at any time step. In contrast to [5], multiple
failures per time unit were allowed, and a transition probability was associated
with failures affecting transmission lines having lower capacities [59]. However, this
data-driven model lacks a key feature of previous models as it does not include
the probability of the cascade stopping at any state. Moreover, one standard
limitation in most of the other cascading failure probabilistic models including
[5, 1, 59] is that they can not predict transmission capacity loss/amount of loadshedding, which is considered to be a critical metric for evaluating the severity of
cascading failure by the IEEE cascading failure working group [58].
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1.3.2

Prior works on interdependent modeling of cascading failures in
smart grids

During the initial stages of cascading-failure analysis in the power grid, most of
the studies were focused on modeling and analyzing failure dynamics in the power
grid in a single, non-interacting environment [11, 5]. Recently, cascading-failure
studies in interdependent systems are emerging. Notably, Buldyrev et al. reported
a graph-based interdependent network study that showed the coupling impacts between interdependent networks while analyzing the percentage of failed nodes in
the steady-state [21]. In [30], the authors proposed a two-phase control policy to
mitigate the cascading-failure in the power grid using the interdependency with
the communication network. Carreras et al. coupled with two complex systems
and investigated the effect of coupled system interactions between infrastructure
systems. [31]. The impact of communication topology on the propagation of
cascading-failure in the power grid was analyzed in [60] using graph theory. The
vulnerability of the power grid in a coupled power-communication grid environment was analyzed in [7], which showed that interconnecting networks could enhance robustness. The impact of various initial failures on physical infrastructure
( e.g., power, communication networks) were analyzed in [8].
Our point of interest is in the probabilistic models, which can be further categorized by the following approaches: Markov-chain based models [5, 45], branching
processes [61], regeneration theory [55], etc. The Interdependent Markov Chain
(IDMC) model [44] by Rahnamay-Naeini et al. captures cascading-failure in a
interdependent system environment (e.g., smart grid). The model considered two
interdependent Markov chains consolidated in a single Markov chain, whose transitions alternate between transitions in the two interdependent networks while
capturing the interdependencies between the two systems represented by Markov
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chains. As an example, the model considered an interdependent power grid and
communication network, and the IDMC model captures the transitions among
power and communication networks’ state variables.
A communication-power coupling parameter d, which captures the topological
changes in the communication network, was modeled in [62]. In recent work, Wang
et al. presented an analytic framework based on a Markov chain for modeling
the dynamics of infrastructure under contingencies, while capturing the effects of
operators’ behavior quantified by the probability of human error under various
circumstances [1]. To quantify the human error during cascading-failures, the
SPAR-H methodology [63] is used to estimate the human error probability (HEP)
for the human performance status in a probabilistic risk assessment approach [64].
The work presented in [64] captures the coupling between the human factor and
the power grid in their proposed analytic model.
1.3.3

Prior works on the role of communication topology on the reliability of power grids

Most of the studies on cascading-failures have focused on cascading-failures
in a single, non-interacting power systems environment [11]. However, in recent
days, a body of work is emerging in studying the cascading-failures in interdependent systems and specifically, the power and communication networks. These
studies aim to identify the behaviors of interdependent systems and how they interact with each other during a failure event. The efforts can be categorized into
three classes: probabilistic analytical models [52, 61, 44], deterministic analytical
models [47] and analysis of failure scenarios using simulations [29]. Our point of
interest is the probabilistic models, which can be further categorized by the following approaches: Markov-chain(MC) based models [5, 1], branching processes
[65, 61], regeneration theory [44], etc. As mentioned previously, Buldyrev et al.
reported a graph-based interdependent network study that showed the coupling
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impacts between interdependent networks [21]. In [30], the authors proposed a
two-phase control policy to mitigate the cascading-failure in the power grid using
the interdependency with the communication network. Carreras et al. coupled
two complex systems and investigated the effect of coupling on the characteristic
properties of that system [31]. The impact of communication topology on the
propagation of cascading-failure in the power grid was analyzed in [60]. In a recent study, Wang et al. showed the interdependency between the power grid and
human operator response during cascading-failures [1].
1.3.4

Prior works on embedding human errors on cascading failure
modeling

In recent years, a substantial amount of work has been done to understand
the role of interdependencies between smart grid subsystems and the dynamics of
cascading failures [21, 7, 20, 30]. Reviews of models modeling cascading failure
dynamics in power grids were reported in [11, 13]. Bench-marking of quasi-steadystate cascading outage analysis methodologies were reported in [58]. However,
none of these works includes the role of human error in modeling cascading failures
in power grids. To quantify the human error, Standardized Plant Analysis Risk
- Human (SPAR-H) [66] methodology was used to identify the critical human
operator attributes, performance shaping factors, and their associated levels [63,
67].
Recently, based on grid-operator interviews, Joana et al. [64], proposed HEP
formulation depending on the performance shaping factors (PSF’s) of the grid
operators using the SPAR-H methodology. The probabilities for each of the PSF
levels were calculated based on the smart-grid operator interviews [64]. A notion
of a comprehensive model including the power grids, communication network, and
the role of human operators were introduced in [68]. However, the details of the
state transition probabilities were absent.
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1.3.5

Prior works on predicting cascading failures using machine learning

A proactive blackout prediction model for a smart grid early warning system
was proposed in [69]. In that work, a support vector machine (SVM) has been
trained with this historical database and is used to predict blackout events in advance. The critical contribution of that paper is that it captures the essence of the
cascading failure using the probabilistic framework and integration of the SVM
machine learning tool to build a prediction rule, which would be able to predict
the scenarios of the blackout as early as possible. However, their data set includes
only 50 cases, which are then used for training and testing purposed. It is challenging to learn the complex dynamics of cascading failures in the power grid using
50 test cases only. Also, the authors reported that for specific parameter values,
100% training and testing accuracy was achieved, which is very unlikely and unrealistic for a sophisticated event like cascading failures. Nonetheless, the paper is
a novel work on proactive cascade prediction using a machine learning approach.
In [70], the authors proposed a machine learning based on Bayes networks to predict cascading failure propagation. Their model named ITEPV collects power
grid data from simulations, and then their model predicts cascading failure propagation with the highest probability using the machine learning technique. This
paper is another work that focuses on data-driven cascade prediction using a machine learning approach, but the authors did not describe how they collected the
data, how they simulated power flow, what simulation software they used, which
make reproducibility of the work difficult. A classification problem was formulated
that classifies a cyber attack from other classical disturbances in the power grid
in [71]. The authors used various machine learning algorithms to evaluate classification performance and tried to find the optimal algorithms under any given
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constraints. The authors observed various measures (accuracy, precision, recall,
and F-Measure) to show that Adaboost+JRipper is the optimal algorithm for
classifying various types of cyber-threats in the power grid. The work is an initial benchmark for disturbance classification in the power grid. The authors used
the WEKA [72] machine learning framework for implementing various algorithms.
Benchmarking of various deep learning algorithms and comparison of %RMSE
reduction by the different algorithms from existing state-of-the-art for load forecasting in smart grid applications was done in [73]. To the best of the authors’
knowledge, no work has been found to classify cascading failures in power grids
as well as predicting essential attributes such as the number of failed transmission
lines and the amount of load shedding for an initial disturbance conditional on the
power grid operating parameters and the topological parameters of the grid. One
of the main reasons is the unavailability of a real-world cascading failure data set.
1.3.6

Prior works on optimizing interdependent system parameters for
enhancing system performance

Probabilistic models on cascading failures [13] in the power grids focus on
both failure dynamics in the power grid in a single, non-interacting environment
[11, 5, 29] or considering the interdependence between the power grid and the
communication network [7, 21, 30, 44]. Two complex systems were coupled to investigate the effect of coupled system interactions between infrastructure systems
in [31]. Buldyrev et al. reported the detrimental effects of interdependence in a
graph-based study, which showed that failures in one system could collapse the
entire interdependent systems and lead to a blackout [21]. A two-phase control
policy to mitigate the cascading-failure in the power grid using the interdependency between the power grid and communication networks was proposed in [30].
A Markov-chain based probabilistic model was proposed in [5], which captures the
dynamics of cascading failure in a power grid using a reduced state space. Sub-
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sequently, the authors proposed an interdependent Markov Chain model [44] that
captures interdependence; however, the model only captures the negative aspects
of coupling. In contrast to [21, 44], [7] showed robustness can be enhanced by interconnecting networks. Rather than having an optimal interdependence reported
in [20], the authors in [7] reported that the risk of cascading failures is minimum
when the infrastructure network interdependence is maximum. Although existing
models capture the influence of communication networks, few works capture the
role of human error on cascading failures mathematically. In recent work, Wang
et al. presented a Markov-chain model to capture the interdependence between
human error and cascading failures in power grids [1]. However, the authors did
not consider the role of communication networks. One general weakness in all
the prior works is the insufficient treatment of the realistic functional interdependency among cyber threats, human factors, and the power grid. The prime focus
of this study is to address both the benefits and harm of interdependence of the
communication network and find a balance between the smart grid’s performance
enhancement and resilience to the cyber threat.
1.3.7

Prior works on modeling initial disturbance leading to cascading
failures

In the last two decades, both single and interdependent models were proposed
by researchers to capture the dynamics of the cascading failure in the power grid.
Our focus is to study probabilistic models which can be further categorized to
Markov-chain based models [45, 5, 1], branching processes [61], regeneration theory
[55]. These models analyze the cascading failures in the power grid based on an
initial event. The interdependent system model [44, 30, 74, 21, 7, 75, 68, 76]
capture the interdependency between layers of the power grid (e.g., power grid,
communication system, and human-operator response) and analyzes cascading
failures in the power grid based on interdependent system environment. A data-
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driven model for simulating the evolution of transmission line failure in power
grids is proposed in [59]. Although failures in the communication layer and human
operator responses are crucial in cascading failure analysis, we ignored their effects
in this paper to simplify our analysis. Bernstein et al. analyzed the power grid
vulnerability due to geographically correlated failures in [34]. Impacts of operating
characteristics on the sensitivity of the power grids to cascading failures are studied
in [77]. In [60], the authors studied the impact of topology in power grids. In [8],
the authors analyze the impact of various initial failures on physical infrastructures
(e.g., communication networks).
1.4 Review of the prior Markov-chain based models used extensively in this dissertation

In this section, we review the prior Markov-chain based models used extensively
in this dissertation.
1.4.1

Review of the Stochastic Abstract State-space Evolution (SASE)
model

There are many physical attributes of the smart grids that collectively contribute to cascading failures, including power generation, substation loads, power
flow distribution through transmission lines, the functionality of grid components,
voltage and phase of transmission lines and buses, and so forth. This results in
substantial detailed state space. It is, therefore, essential that effective spate-space
reduction is performed before any scalable and tractable analytical model of cascading failures can be developed. To address the scalability challenge, a methodology was developed in [5], where the space of all detailed power-grid states is
partitioned into a collection of equivalence classes. The equivalence relation is
defined through a set of reduced state variables that are deemed to govern the
cascading behavior as determined by extensive analysis of experimental and sim-
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ulation data. The detailed power-grid states in the same class are represented by
a few aggregate state-variables, with the same values. Such partitioning of the
state space (of the detailed state-space of the power grid) implies that detailed
power-grid states in the same class will be indistinguishable as far as the cascading
behavior is concerned. Each class of the power grid states is termed an abstract
state.
Specifically, the physical variables defining each equivalence class are, number
of transmission-line failures, F , the maximum capacity of the failed lines, C max ,
and a binary variable, I, which depends implicitly (and non-linearly) on all the
detailed variables. It is judiciously introduced to capture the complex event of the
cascade stopping compressively. If the power grid is in a cascading mode, then
I=0, and the cascade will continue. Conversely, the cascading failure terminates
if the power grid is in an absorbing state, namely when I=1. To address the
dynamic nature of cascades, a Markov chain is defined on the reduced state space,
and the transition probabilities have been extracted using physics-based modeling
combined with data analytics. Since the formation of the transition probabilities
is learned from data, they capture the role of the hidden variables that have
been eliminated in the state-space reduction. A key component in the transition
probability matrix is the state-dependent cascading-stop probability, Pstop , i.e.,
the probability that the binary state variable I=1.
The SASE model developed in [5] can effectively predict the underlying distribution of the blackout can be calculated analytically using the model. The
model was validated using the comparison between the distribution obtained using Monte Carlo simulation of the grid and the analytical result as shown in Figure
1.6. The simulated distribution and the analytical distribution closely match, i.e.,
the model is able to find the distribution of blackout size analytically using the evolution of the Markov chain which is independent of the simulated result obtained
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Figure 1.6: The analytical and empirical conditional PMF of the blackout size (a)
without stress (b) with stress for Fi =2 and Cimax =20MW [5].

Figure 1.7: Probability of reaching a blackout follows historical blackout trends
for (a) with Fi =3 and (b) with Fi =6, and different values of Cimax [5].
from Monte Carlo simulations of the smart grid.
Again, the model can predict the evolution of cascading failures for various
state variables and operating condition of the grid as observed in historical blackout trends in Figures 1.4 and 1.5.
1.4.2

Review of Interdependent Markov-Chain (IDMC) Approach

To model the cascading-failure dynamics, a Markov-chain based Stochastic
Abstract State Evolution (SASE) model was developed in [5]. The state-space of
the Markov chain consisted of two state variables: the number of failures in the
system, xn (n ≥ 1) and a {0, 1}-valued variable termed cascade-stability of the
system, in , for which i = 0 indicates the system is susceptible to further failures
and i = 1 indicates that no further failures are possible, and hence the system
has entered a cascade-stable mode. The SASE model allows us to predict the
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distribution of the failed transmission-lines as a function of time, and also allows
us to calculate the probability distribution of the blackout size. The transition
probability matrix in the SASE model involves physical operating parameters of
the power system, and its entries are state-dependent. The operating characteristics considered in the SASE model are based on power grid simulations, and they
include line-tripping threshold e, power-grid loading level r, and the load-shedding
constraint level θ.
In subsequent work, the SASE model was expanded to the IDMC model in
order to capture cascading-failure in the interdependent system environment (i.e.,
smart grid) [44]. The model considered two interdependent Markov chains consolidated in a single Markov chain, whose transitions alternate between transitions
in the two interdependent networks. As an example, the model considered power
grid and communication network, and as the Markov chain progresses, transition
toggles between power grid variables and communication network state variables.
Specifically, the state-space of the IDMC model contains variables of the form
Sn = (xn , in , yn , ln , kn ), as compared to Sn = (xn , in ) in the SASE model. The
newly- introduced variable yn is defined as the number of failures in the communication network. Moreover, ln captures the state transition turns between the
two networks, where ln = 0 indicates the last transition has occurred in the power
grid, and ln = 1 indicates the last transition has occurred in the communication
network. Finally, the state variable Kn captures the history of transitions: it indicates whether a failure has occurred in the last transition at time n − 1. However,
the IDMC model does not explicitly capture the role of the dynamic topological
attributes of the communication network.
1.4.3

Review of the human SASE (hSASE) model

Wang et al. developed a Markov-chain based human-stochastic abstract state
evolution (hSASE) model including the role of human error [1], where the space of

19

all detailed power-grid states is partitioned into a collection of equivalence classes.
The model captures the cascading failures in the power grid, including HEP into
the state-space of the Markov chain [1]. To calculate the HEP, the authors used
the HEP formulation based on performance shaping factor (PSF) level multipliers
adopted from [64]. However, [1] has the following limitations. First, the mapping
of the human PSFs with the power grid variables is very coarse. Second, the
distribution of the PSFs is not embedded in the dynamics of cascading failures.
Third, the model only considered two PSFs that have a direct correlation with
the propagation of failures (out of the eight available in [64]). Other factors, such
as experience, work process, and procedures, were ignored.
1.5 Benefits and threats of interdependency between power grid layers

Unlike traditional power grids, the interdependency with a communication network is an inherent attribute of smart grids, as they require seamless integration of
traditional power-plants, distributed energy resources (DERs) such as wind farms,
solar, and microgrids, as well as operation and management systems. Increased
interdependency between the power grid and the supporting communication networks allows power-grid operators to detect faults and implement robust control
actions to enhance the resilience of the grid. On the negative side of having more
interdependency, degradation in the communication and control networks, resulting from a cyber-attack, will impact the ability to prevent or slow-down cascading
failures in the power grid. Higher grid-communication interdependency increases
the exposure to cyber threat: hackers/attackers may intercept communication
networks and alter the control decisions by altering sensor data, injecting false
data, and so forth.
Conversely, power outages can lead to degradation in the information flow
from power nodes to the operators at the control center. Additionally, human
operators are also a critical component of the smart grid, and they introduce a
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new level of interdependency between the power grid and the communication and
control networks. For instance, as the communication and control capabilities
are degraded as a result of a cyber-attack, cascading failures in the power grids
can ensue, which altogether can create a stressful and intense environment for
the operators, which, in turn, increases the probability of operator errors as they
diagnose and implement corrective actions, which further exacerbates the cascade
in the smart grid [13, 10].
Based on the real-world examples provided above, it is of great importance
to study the interdependencies between these coupled systems (e.g., power grid
and communication network) in order to understand the coupling effects so that
cascading-failures can be prevented under stressed scenarios. Understanding the
impacts, both negative and positive, of information-centric smart grids is critical
in predicting the reliability and the resilience of the smart-grid. A robust interconnection strategy is required to balance the trade-off between grid’s performance
enhancement and the resilience of the grid to cyber threat, i.e., maximize the
benefit of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) information while
containing the exposure to the cyber threat which is the main thrust of this dissertation.
1.6 Contribution of this dissertation

The main thrust of this dissertation is to analyze the strong interplay between
the power grid and the corresponding communication and control network, which
plays a pivotal role in the reliability and resilience of the smart grid. The dynamics of the interdependence among smart-grid subsystems such as the power grid,
communication network, and response of human operators are captured during
the propagation of cascading failures.
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1.6.1

Benefits and harm of communication

The first contribution of this dissertation (discussed in detail in chapter 4)
is that a previously developed Markov-chain based model is refined into an interdependent Markov chain model to capture the role of cyber threat from the
communication network and the human-operator error during cascading failures.
The state transitions of the Markov chain are parameterized by the critical operating parameters of the power grid. The calculations assume a generic form of
correlation between the level of and damage from cyber-attacks, on the one hand,
and the level of interdependence on the other hand. The model finds the optimal
level of interdependence, i.e., the trade-off between well-informed control and vulnerability to attacks that minimizes the probability of massive cascading failures
in power grids. There is a point of diminishing returns beyond which the harm of
exposure to cyber threat outweighs the benefits of information.
1.6.2

Human error as a function of grid variables

The second contribution of this dissertation is that the role of human factors associated with the grid operators, e.g., human-error probability (HEP), is
modeled as a function of the grid conditions as well as operators’ training and
experience levels (discussed in detail in chapter 3). Moreover, the HEP is embedded in a previously reported Markov-chain model that generates the probability
distribution of the blackout as a function of time following a trigger. Specifically,
through the HEP, the Markov-chain’s transition matrix includes the dynamics of
detailed smart-grid operator attributes. To derive the grid-state dependent HEP,
three real-valued performance shaping factors (PSFs), representing critical human
attributes of the operators, are mapped to the grid-state variables, thereby capturing the correlation between the evolution of the PSF levels and the propagation
of transmission-line failures. This mapping is established based on a histogram-
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equalization principle [78], which utilizes the experimentally-estimated probability
distribution of the PSF levels while assuming a monotone relationship between the
HEP values and number of line failures. Further, the distribution of the PSF levels
was used to identify the critical combinations of PSF levels that correspond to an
event with high joint probability as well as a high HEP.
1.6.3

Estimating average transmission capacity loss and load loss

The third contribution is the development of an analytical model to predict
the average transmission-capacity loss and load loss during a cascading failure
as a function of time and their steady-state values (discussed in detail in chapter 5). Cascading failures in the power grid are described using a Markov-chain
approach, in which the state transition probabilities depend on the number and
capacities of the failed lines. The transition matrix is characterized by parametrically using Monte Carlo simulations of cascading failures in the power grid. The
severity of cascading failure is estimated using two metrics: the expected number
of transmission-line failures and the amount of load shedding/load loss (inferred
from the average transmission capacity loss) in the steady-state. These two metrics provide critical information regarding the severity of a cascading failure in a
power grid (in terms of both the distribution of blackout sizes and the amounts
of load shedding). One of the benefits of this model is that it enables the understanding of the effect of initial failures and the operating parameters of the power
grid on cascading failures.
1.6.4

Role of communication topology on the reliability of power grids

The fourth contribution is the modeling of the impact of the power grid and
communication network interdependencies on the reliability of the power grid by
capturing the influence of the communication network on the power grid during the
cascading phenomenon (discussed in detail in chapter 2). Two critical topological
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parameters of the communication network are studied, namely the hop distance
and the node degree, which are used to determine the behavior of the coupling
parameter between the two systems and to quantify the influence of communication network in the power grid. Finally, numerical results have been carried out
to quantify the impact of communication network failure on power grid reliability
and validate our proposed model.
1.6.5

Impact of initial conditions on grid reliability

The fifth contribution of this dissertation is the analysis of cascading failures
in the power grid under various initial conditions modeled analytically (discussed
in detail in chapter 6). First, Gaussian, circular, and linear stressors are used
as the initial events to model the probability of transmission line failure due to
the stressors. Second, Monte-Carlo simulations are used to analyze the impact
of cascading failures in the power grid based on the initial failure patterns. The
reported results show that upon the occurrence of an initial triggering event, a
combination of parameters (e.g., the number of stressors, the number of failed
transmission lines in each stressor location, the capacity of the failed transmission
lines, the power-grid loading level, the load-shedding constraints at the time of
the stressor event) strongly influence the dynamics of cascading failures and may
lead to massive blackouts.
1.6.6

Predicting Cascading Failures using machine learning algorithms

The sixth contribution of this dissertation is that we classify cascading failures
in a power grid that leads to massive blackouts in power grids using machine learning algorithms (discussed in detail in chapter 7). Since real-world cascading failure
data is not available, we create a synthetic cascading failure simulator framework
to generate cascading-failure data for various power grid operating parameters.
We include the topological parameters such as edge betweenness centrality, the
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average shortest distance for various combinations of two transmission line failures in our data set. Then we apply various machine learning algorithms to classify
cascading failures and compare accuracy. Further, we use regressive models to predict the number of failed transmission line and the amount of load shedding. This
data-driven technique is useful to quickly predict and classify cascading failures
based on the input power grid conditions, and hence power grid design engineers
can use this to increase the robustness of the grid.
1.7 Organization of this dissertation

This dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2.1, we first describe our
cascading failure simulator (CFS) framework. There is no straightforward and
publicly available cascading failures analysis tool. However, a widely accepted
MATPOWER [79] tool for power flow simulation are available where power flow
analysis can be done using IEEE standard case studies (case studies can also be
customized). In this dissertation, we have used the MATPOWER power flow tool
for power flow analysis and developed our cascading failure simulator on top of
it. The detailed framework of the simulator, along with the algorithms, will be
discussed in chapter 2.1.
Next, in chapter 2, we model the impact of communication network failures
on power grid reliability and present a naive analytic approach for modeling
cascading-failures in power grids including communication and human operator
impacts.
Then, in chapter 3, we establish a correlation between grid-operators’ performance with cascading failures in smart-grids.
Next, In chapter 4, we develop the interdependent cascading failure model.
First, we discuss the interdependencies between coupled layers. Next, we present
a detailed discussion about the modeling of system operator errors and the use of
the distribution of the operators’ performance shaping factor distributions. Here
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we map the human error levels as a function of the state variables of the Markov
chain. Next, we discuss the trade-off between the grid’s performance enhancement
and risks of cyber threats. We then modify this approach to capture the dynamics
of cyber threats using a state variable of the Markov chain.
Further, we refine the base SASE model in chapter 5 to model the dynamics
of transmission capacity and load loss during cascading failures in power grids.
To this point, we have assumed that the initial conditions occur due to various
natural and human-made events but did not model the initial conditions. In
chapter 6, we model the impact of an initial stressor(s) on cascading failures in
power grids.
Next, in chapter 7, we discuss how the cascading failure simulation framework
developed in chapter 2.1 can be used to collect data, which can be used to feed
machine learning models for regression and classification purposes. We use various
machine learning algorithms and make a comparison of the model performance.
Finally, we conclude our dissertation with the summary and future directions
in chapter 8.
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Chapter 2
Multi-layer Markov-chain based cascading-failures model

Recent studies on interdependent systems have considered interactions either
between the power grid and the communication network [7, 21, 30, 44]. There are
also efforts in understanding the role of human operators’ on the reliability of the
power grids [1]. However, the study of these systems considering the interactions
among power grid, communication network, and human operators’ have not been
presented heretofore.
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive three-layer model for capturing
cascading-failure dynamics that take into account the interdependency among the
three-layers’ (i.e., power grid, communication network, and human factors) of the
grid. The Markov-chain based model (SASE and IDMC; described in chapter
1) is used to capture the dynamics of cascading-failures. Precisely, cascadingfailure dynamics in the power grid capture the internal dynamics of the power
grid as well as performance and connectivity degradation’s in the communication
network and the human errors through the Markov chain abstraction. Failures of
communication components can cause a delay in communication, which can affect
critical control signals from supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). In
the human-factor layer, operators’ behavior will be affected by the status of both
of the power system and the communication network. When failures occur in the
power system, operators’ may face stress and could make decisions that are not
optimal. Hence, operators’ may take wrong actions or no action to contingencies
in the power system. Any of the sub-optimal choices made by the operators
mentioned above can be considered as human error in the three-layer model.
A critical insight obtained from the proposed three-layer model to the smart
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Figure 2.1: IEEE 118-bus topology (control-center marked). Green and orange
mark defines the clusters we used for simulation in Section 2.4.3 [6].
grid infrastructure is that interdependencies among reliable systems, i.e., systems
with exponentially distributed failure sizes, can make the overall system behave
unreliably, as evidenced by power-law distributions for the overall system while
individual layers’ exhibited exponentially distributed failure sizes. To the best of
our knowledge, a combined interaction among power, communication, and human
layers’ were not considered in any of the previous works relating to the cascadingfailure studies of the power grid. As the critical contribution of this work, we
analyze the coupled interactions among these three-layers’ and develop a comprehensive model that captures the complex dynamics of the cascading-failures in the
power grid.
2.1 Simulating cascading failures in power grids

The basic structure of the cascading failure simulation framework was developed in a prior dissertation work [80]. Due to the dependence of the simulation
framework on the successive works, we first summarize the development of the simulation framework. The following link contains the simulation codes used in this
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dissertation (https://github.com/rashuvro/Modeling-Cascading-failures-in-smartgrids-Ph.D.-research-)
2.2 Cascading failure simulation (CFS) framework

We use MATPOWER [79], a package of MATLAB m-files for solving the
steady-state DC/AC power flow optimization problem [81]. It uses the powerflow distribution framework under the given set of constraints. The standard
power flow or load flow problem involves solving for the set of voltages and flows
in a network corresponding to a specified pattern of load and generation [81].
MATPOWER includes solvers for both AC and DC optimal power flow problems,
both of which involve solving a set of equations of the form g(x) = 0. In this
dissertation, we develop our data set using the DC optimal power flow for simplicity. Here the word optimal refers that the power flow solutions depend on a
set of constraints, and each time the best possible solution is provided satisfying
the set of constraints. Although the AC power flow captures detailed dynamics of
cascading failures in power grids, including the transient effects, the effect on the
number of transmission line failures is found to be incremental [33].
2.2.1

Overview of the CFS framework

We show a flowchart in Figure 2.2 that illustrates the CFS framework used in
this dissertation. We start with some initial number of transmission-line failure
in the power grid initiated from an arbitrary initial event. The initial failures can
be the outcome of a variety of initial incidents ranging from natural disasters to
intentional sabotages. In subsequent work in this dissertation, we will show an
approach for modeling these initial disturbance events. Here, it is important to
note that we fail at least two transmission lines initially because the power grid
is robust against one transmission line failure due to N-1 security considerations.
Various incidents can trigger transmission line failures initially in the power grid,
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Figure 2.2: Flowchart of the cascading failure process in power grid
and we start our simulation using those failed transmission lines. The initial
transmission line failures are randomly distributed over the space of the grid. We
assume to have sufficient knowledge regarding the power grid topology and the
operating parameters before the initial triggering event. We then remove the failed
transmission lines from the system and check whether any islands are formed in
the power grid because of those line failures. An island is a self-sufficient local
network that operates independently when disconnected from the base network,
having a set of generators and loads. Depending on whether any islands are
formed or not, we then solve the DC optimal power flow using MATPOWER
on each island. Note that, in the simulations, if the grids get islanded, we keep
track all the islands (as if they are now individual grids) and run power-flow
simulation in individual islands separately. Then we estimate the probability
cascade stop and its parameters parametrically using the combined data obtained
from all the islanded grids, not from the largest component of the grid. This
approach implicitly captures islanding and its effects in the analytical model. For
example, if a set of initial conditions result in various range of islands in the
simulation, the estimated cascade stop probability would be different. If we have
overloaded lines in the system, we can fail those lines, probabilistically fail a set
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of lines among them (e.g., failing top N lines ranked using overload) or fail one
transmission line per iteration of the power flow. In this dissertation, we use a
similar approach used in [5] for islanding and overloading calculations and share
two algorithms for calculating islanding and overloading in power grids. We repeat
the same process until we end up with a system with no overloaded lines, which
indicates the cascade-end.
This simulation framework is then used to perform Monte-Carlo simulations
[82], which is a renowned computational simulation technique to obtain numerical
results using random sampling. In Monte Carlo simulations, a subset of samples is
chosen randomly from the population and then used to calculate the statistics of
the population such as mean, distribution of the population. In our work, we use
Monte Carlo technique to simulate cascading failures for various initial conditions
of the grid chosen randomly, observe the cascading failure behaviors using the
simulation framework described above, and then use the sample data to estimate
the probability of cascade stop, which is a key parameter that governs the state
transition probabilities of the Markov chain.
2.2.2

Power grid operating parameters and variables for cascading failures

Based on power grid simulations and prior works, we identify the following
power grid operating parameters that govern the cascading failure dynamics. In
our simulation, we use the IEEE 118-bus system (which is a simple approximation
of the American Electric Power system (in the U.S. Midwest) [83]) as the test case
which contains 186 transmission lines, 118 buses (nodes) and 54 generators.
power grid loading level, r: We define the power grid loading level, r ∈ [0, 1]
as the ratio of the total load demand, and the generation capacity of the power grid.
In the IEEE 118-bus system, the maximum generation is 9966MW. r = 1 indicates
the demand is 9966MW and r ∈ [0, 1] scales the power demand with respect
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to maximum possible generation. In our simulation, we simulate the cascading
failures with various r. Note that a higher value of r increases the stress in the
grid. We observe that for r < 0.5, the power grid is under no stress and can
absorb the impact of two transmission line failures and redistribute the power
flow without any further failures.
load-shedding constraint, θ: The load-shedding constraint is defined as
the ratio of uncontrollable loads (loads that do not participate in load shedding)
and the total load in the power grid denoted by, θ ∈ [0, 1]. This is an important
parameter to ensure the control actions by the power grid operator. θ = 1 indicates
that all the loads are uncontrollable, and the human operators can perform no load
shedding. Again, θ = 0 indicates that the operators can shed any load on the grid.
In this paper, we consider equal load shedding constraints over all the loads in the
grid. Further, we choose θ randomly between [0,1] in our simulations. Similar to
r, a higher value of θ increases the probability of cascading failure in the power
grid.
Capacity estimation error, e: The Capacity estimation error, e ∈ [0, 1] is
defined as the error by the control center in its estimation of the actual capacity
of the lines. In our CFS framework, this parameter is used to calculate overloaded
lines. We used the same approach used in [5] to calculate overloaded lines. When
power flow in a transmission line exceeds (1-e)× capacity, we consider that line as
an overloaded line. We estimate the capacity of a transmission line using power
flow simulation under maximum loads, i.e., when generation equals demand (r=1).
Note that, since we use DC power flow simulation, there are no transient effects,
and we can use the maximum generation without any issues. We quantize the flow
capacity of a transmission line into a set of five capacities {20, 80, 200, 500, 800}
MW [81], and assign this capacity of the transmission line as a constraint of the
MATPOWER power flow optimization problem (discussed later). In this paper,
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we collect cascading failure data using various values of e.
In addition to the parameters mentioned above, we use the optimal power flow
algorithm from MATPOWER, which includes the capability of implementing load
shedding depending on cost. In our simulations, we set the cost of load shedding
ten times higher than the cost of generation to ensure maximum generation before
any load shedding. We track the cumulative amount of load shedding as a critical
grid parameter. We keep track of the number of failed transmission lines and the
maximum capacity of the failed lines during the propagation of cascading failures.
2.2.3

Optimal power flow

We solve the following DC optimal power flow equation 2.1 where F is a vector
of power flow in transmission lines, A is a matrix whose elements can be calculated in terms of the connectivity of transmission lines in the power grid, and the
impedance of the lines and P is a vector which contains the generator information.

F = AP

(2.1)

The optimization cost function and constraints are as follows,

cost =

X

wig gi +

i∈G

X
j∈L

with the following optimization constraints
(1) Power flow equations (1).
(2) Generator power: 0 ≤ gi ≤ Gmax
,i ∈ G
i
(3) Controllable loads: (1-θj )Lj ≤bj ≤ 0,
i ∈ L,lj = bj + θj Lj
(4) Transmission line power flow: Fk ≤ Ckopt
P
P
(5) Power balance: i∈G gi + j∈L lj = 0,

wjl lj

(2.2)
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where gi is the output of each generator, and li is the output at each load. Ckopt
is the generator capacity.In this
is the capacity of a transmission line, and Gmax
i
cost function, wig and wjl are positive values representing the generation cost and
the load-shedding cost for every node, respectively. Controllable loads are defined
using θ parameter. Finally, the power balance is done by the optimizer using a
reference generator, typically the generator with the largest generation capacity
is selected as the reference generator. The output of the MATPOWER contains
power flow through each transmission line satisfying the constraints. If the load is
greater than generation, than the excessive load is curtailed as load shedding. At
this point, one might ask if the MATPOWER gives a power flow solution based
on the set of constraints, then why there will be overloading? The answer is in
the original MATPOWER solution; there is no overloading. However, to simulate
cascading failure in power grids, we introduce a power flow estimation error ∈ [0, 1]
(discussed in detail later in this chapter), which controls the cascading mechanism.
A higher power flow estimation error increases the chance of overloaded lines in
the system and hence the probability of cascading failures. Again, the optimal
power flow utilizes dispatchable loads to implement load shedding when the cost
of generation is higher than the cost of serving loads. Here, since the load shed
cost is set higher than the generation cost, load shedding is only performed when
the optimizer fails to satisfy the other optimization constraints since analyzing the
optimal generation and loads are not in the scope of this work.
2.2.4

Algorithms for finding the island and overloaded lines

Recall that we use DC optimal power-flow from MATPOWER, which is used
in many cascading failure analysis papers [32, 29, 7, 5] for simplicity. However,
we use a small failure probability(≤ 0.05) of the neighboring lines, which makes
our model from deterministic to stochastic. We use the following algorithm for
finding the maximum overloaded lines shown in algorithm 1.

36
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding maximum overloaded lines probabilistically.
Require: α, P F, Capacity
Ensure: F ailedIndex
1: for i ← 1 to M do
2:
Plf (i) ← abs(P F (i))/((1 − α) ∗ Capacity(i))
3: P robT est ← 0
4: for i ← 1 to M do
5:
if rand < LinkP rob(i) then
6:
if (P robT est < Plf (i)) then
7:
P robT est = Plf (i));
8:
F ailedIndex = i
return F ailedIndex
From the power flow data, overloaded transmission lines can be calculated,
which is used in several previous works [84, 5, 1, 32] to fail transmission lines
in the power grid. We consider a line failure when power flow through a line
exceeds the maximum allowable power flow limit through that transmission line.
Once we find overflow in a transmission line, we fail that line and re-calculate
optimal power flow (OPF) using the remaining transmission lines. We take one or
multiple transmission line failures per time unit to understand the cascading failure
dynamics effectively. One way to choose one transmission line to fail out of all the
overloaded lines is that if multiple transmission lines exceed the capacity threshold,
we fail the line with the maximum deviation from the overflow threshold. Since the
power grid needs to balance generation and load, the overloaded failed transmission
lines can initiate a cascade of failures in the successive time steps.
Algorithm 2 shows our methodology for solving power flow in each of the
islands created during the simulation. Recall that, an island in a power grid is
a self-sufficient grid network containing both load and generators created when
transmission line failure breaks the vast connected network into a small localized
connected network. During each iteration, we calculate the number of islands
formed in the grid and solve power flow simulation at each island using algorithm
2.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for solving power flow in each islanded grid
Require: mpc, S, C
Ensure: GD, P F
SG = sparse(AdjM atrix)
[S, c] = graphconncomp(G)
for i ← 1 to s do
struct mpc[s] ← mpc
[P F, GD] = rundcopf (mpc[s])
return GD, P F

2.3 Influence of communication network on the reliability of the power Grid

In this section, we study the influence of communication network functionality
on the power grid. Specifically, we analyze the impact of power-communication
interdependency on the reliability of the power grid during cascading failures. Two
topological parameters of the communication network are studied, namely the hop
distance and the node degree, which are used to determine the coupling between
the two systems and to quantify the influence of the communication network on
the power grid. We model the power-communication coupling parameter d, which
captures the topological changes in the communication network. We study the
influence of the power grid by analyzing the dependency between communicationlink failures and transmission-line failures. The characterization of the coupling
parameter, d is based on two topological parameters of the communication network, namely the hop distance and the node degree. The IDMC model in [44] refers
to this coupling parameter but considered it as a constant. Instead, we formulate
the coupling parameter d as a linear combination of the minimum hop distance
and the maximum node degree of the failed communication nodes. Our observations illustrate that a decrease in the minimum hop distance or an increase in the
maximum node degree of the failed communication nodes increases the probability
of cascading failures in the power grid. By characterizing the coupling parameter,
d, we analyze the impact of failures in the communication network on cascading-
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failures in the power grid. Finally, numerical results have been carried out to
quantify the impact of communication network failure on power grid reliability
and validate our proposed work.
We start by adopting the IEEE 118-bus topology used in [6] for the transmission network of the power grid and use it to extract a topology for the communication network. In particular, communication nodes are placed at each substation,
and communication links are set along each transmission-line similar to Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, which is extensively used as
a communication system in the power grid. Furthermore, there is one or multiple
communication node(s) serving as a control center(s) in the power grid. Similar
topologies of the power grid and communication networks were also considered in
[7]. The control center monitors the health of the power grid and takes supervisory actions based on events to maintain optimal power flow. Figure 2.1 shows the
control center (red circle) we used in IEEE 118-bus system. In this work, we have
chosen the node with the largest node degree as the control center. Under normal
operation, when disturbances occur in the power grid, operators at the control
center can reconfigure the system by re-calculating the power flow and shedding
a certain amount of loads. The load-shedding is usually done either manually or
through an intelligent load-shedding management system over the communication
network to balance the power flow [77].
We examine the dynamics of the communication network topology and its
impact on the cascading-failure by including three key attributes describing the
status of the communication network. The three attributes are the number of
communication-node failures (yn ), the maximum degree of the failed communicationnodes (rn ), the minimum hop distance of the failed communication-nodes from
the control center (hn ). Specifically, using [44], the state transition probability f (sn+1 |sn ) from state Sn = (xn , in , yn , ln , kn , hn , rn ) to the next state Sn+1 =
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(xn+1 , in+1 , yn+1 , ln+1 , kn+1 , hn+1 , rn+1 ) is expressed below:

f (sn+1 |sn ) =




1 if in = 1, xn+1 = xn , ln+1 = ln , yn+1 = yn








q(yn ) if in = in+1 = 0, ln = 0, xn+1 = xn , yn+1 = yn + 1








1 − q(yn ) if in = in+1 = 0, ln = 0 , xn+1 = xn , yn+1 = yn







1 − p(xn )(1−d(yn ,hn ,rn ))
(kn +(1−d(yn ,hn ,rn )(1−kn ))




if in = in+1 = 0, ln = 1, xn+1 = xn + 1, yn+1 = yn







p(xn )(1−d(yn ,hn ,rn ))


(kn +(1−d(yn ,hn ,rn ))(1−kn ))







if in = 0, in+1 = 1, ln = 1, xn+1 = xn , yn+1 = yn







0 otherwise
(2.3)
To this end, we express the communication network state at time n as a function
of yn , rn and hn . The newly introduced variables hn and rn further characterize
the transition probability of the states, which were not considered in [44]. Note
that, q(yn ) is the probability of having one additional failure in the communication
network.
Here, the quantity d(yn , rn , hn ) indicates the coupling effect from communication network to power grid, and p(xn ) is the probability of transiting to a stable
state from a state with xn transmission-line failures. Note that, f (sn+1 |sn ) represents state transitions under different combinations of the state variables (includes
newly added hn and rn ) which are consistent with the IDMC model [44]. In the
following section, we model the interdependency function d(yn , rn , hn ), which captures the effects of the communication topology on cascading-failures. This is a
major departure from the model reported in [44], where d was assumed to be a
constant and the role of communication topology was not considered.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical probability distribution, over the number of failed communication links, of the minimum hop distance of the center node to failed links (left)
and the maximum degree (right) of failed nodes.

2.4 Modeling the communication-power interdependency function

In this section, we model the interdependency function d(yn , rn , hn ).
2.4.1

Simulation setup

To evaluate the influence of the communication network on the power grid,
we have developed a coupled communication and power-grid simulator. We conducted extensive Monte-Carlo simulations using MATPOWER [79], a package
of MATLAB m-files for solving the optimal power flow problems. To simulate
cascading-failures in power grids, we have used the approach described in chapter
2.1.
Specifically, the loading ratio, r of the power grid in the simulations, is assumed
0.7. The line tripping threshold, e, and the load-shedding constraint level,θ are
assumed 0.3 and 0.2, respectively. Note that such a power-system operating setting makes the power grid under stress [5]. Now we initially fail a few random
transmission-line failures in the power grid. Next, with probability q(yn ) we simulate the associated communication-link failures which is adopted from the IDMC
[44] model that includes a general term similar to q(yn ). The probability q(yn )
represents the influence of the power grid on the communication network. Following the simulation of the communication link failure, power flow through the
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Figure 2.4: Empirical probability distribution of the communication-link failure
over the minimum hop distance of the failed links (left) and the maximum node
degree of the failed nodes (right).
transmission-lines in the power-grid is re-calculated. The overloaded line is failed
using the line-failure algorithm described in chapter 2.1. In the simulation, we
also assume that failures of communication links that are directly connected to
the control center influence the failure in the power grid. Because, in a physical
grid, the control center cannot send the necessary control signals to optimize the
power flow through the missing communication path [7]. Communication links
that are directly connected to the control center have a higher impact on reliability compared to other communication links as control centers are expected to
monitor and interact with the electric devices remotely in real-time [74]. Hence,
in the simulations, we scale up the probability of transmission-line failures in the
power system based on the number of failed communication links that are directly
connected to the control center. In the next subsection, the results of this simulation will be used to extract an analytical formula for the interdependency function
d(yn , rn , hn ).
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2.4.2

Modeling the interdependency as a function of hop distance and
node degree

Simulation results suggest that the communication nodes with higher degrees
or lower hop distances have a greater impact on cascading-failures in the powergrid than the communication nodes with lower degrees or higher hop distances. In
particular, the probability for the occurrence of cascading-failures in power grids
increases when some communication node with high degrees or small hop distances
from the control center fails. Here we develop a simple form, in conjunction
with certain reasonable assumptions (originated from the results of the optimal
power-flow simulation), to approximately represent the interdependency function,
d(yn , rn , hn ), whose range is in the interval [0,1]. The proposed form of d(yn , rn , hn )
is:
ail
ail
d(yn , rn , hn ) = wpfhop
(hn ) + (1 − w)pfdegree
(rn )

(2.4)

ail
where w is a weight factor between 0 and 1. In equation (2.4), the terms pfhop
(hn )
ail
and pfdegree
(rn ) refer to the probability distribution, which indicates the proba-

bility of a communication-link failure attributed to the minimum hop-distance
state and maximum node-degree state, respectively. These probabilities can be
estimated from the simulation study. Figure 2.3 shows the dependence of the
minimum hop distance (left) and maximum node degree (right) with the number
of failed communication links. We then compute the empirical probability distribution of communication-link failures as a function of the minimum hop-distance
(between the central communication node and the failed communication links)
and the maximum node-degree (of the failed communication nodes), as shown in
Figure 2.4. Note that, in the right Figure of 2.4, when the mean of maximum
node degree was eight, the probability value did not follow the increasing trend
because of lack of enough samples. The observations in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 im-
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Figure 2.5: Hop distance (left) and node degree (right) distribution as a function
of failed communication links.
ply that the interdependency function d on the state variables rn and hn can be
ail
made implicit through the variable yn , i.e., d(yn ). Hence, we can express pfhop
(hn )
ail
ail
ail
and pfdegree
(rn ) as p̃fhop
(yn ) and p̃fdegree
(yn ), respectively. In order to completely
ail
characterize d(yn ), we further need to have analytical formulas for p̃fhop
(yn ) and
ail
p̃fdegree
(yn ). From Figure 2.4, we observe that the probability of communication-

link failures, attributed to a certain minimum hop-distance (left) and maximum
node-degree (right), respectively, follows a certain trend. Specifically, we can divide the observed behavior in each probability graph into two phases. For the
minimum hop-distance probability (from Figure 2.4 (left)), we observed that at
phase one, the probability of communication-link failure is decreasing from the
maximum. While during phase two, the probability of communication-link failure
ail
is at minimum. Hence, we propose the following formula for p̃fhop
(yn ):

ail
ail
p̃fhop
(yn ) = pfhop
(hn ) =




 a41 if 1 ≤ hn ≤ m
h
n





if

(2.5)

hn > m

Here, we introduced the variable a1 to represent the disturbance incurred when
the minimum hop-distance of the communication system at unity. A minimum
hop-distance value, hn = m, indicates a critical value where the probability of
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ail
failure p̃fhop
(yn ) decreases from a1 to  and enters from phase one to phase two

(our results suggests  =0.01).
From Figure 2.4 (right), the probability of failure at maximum node degree
during phase one is minimal and equals to . A maximum node degree value,
ail
rn = n, indicates a critical value where the probability of failure p̃fdegree
(yn ) exceeds
ail
 (enters from phase one to phase two) and for values rn > n, p̃fdegree
(yn ) increases
ail
monotonically. Hence, we propose the following formula for p̃fdegree
(yn ):

ail
ail
p̃fdegree
(yn ) = pfdegree
(rn ) =






if

1 ≤ rn < n

(2.6)



a2 rn4 +  if rn ≥ n
Similar to variable a1 considered for the minimum hop-distance, we introduce
a variable a2 to represent the disturbance incurred from maximum node-degree
of the communication system at unity. With equation (2.5 and (2.6) at hand, we
have completely modeled d(yn ).
To this end, the interdependency function d can be approximated by a function that depends on yn alone. Generally, we note that d(yn ) has the maximum
value when the failed communication links have the minimum hop distance hn and
maximum node degree rn for any given communication network. Intuitively, the
lower the value of d(yn ), the more stable the power grid is. Specifically, d(yn ) = 0
indicates that there is no dependency of communication-network failure on powersystem failures. In contrast, d(yn ) = 1 implies deterministic failure in the power
system, i.e., every failure of the transmission-line will cause a failure in the associated communication link. Throughout this paper we will assume w = 0.5, i.e.,
equal weights for simplicity.
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Figure 2.6: Blackout size distribution, ten initial random failures each with certain
hop distance of two, four and six.

2.4.3

Simulation of the IEEE 118-bus system including communication network influence for different case

Using the aforementioned simulator, we have simulated the IEEE 118-bus system for different types of failure scenarios and empirically calculated the blackout
distributions for each case. We have simulated the communication topology based
on the following two particular scenarios.
First, we have simulated the blackout distribution in the power grid for ten
initial communication node and power line failures with various hop distances.
From Figure 2.6, we observed that failure in communication nodes with lower hop
distances has higher blackout distribution as failures increase. This observation
signifies that we have a higher probability of cascading-failure when failures occur
at lower hop distances while keeping the node degree of the failed nodes fixed.
Thus, we conclude that the blackout probability increases as the mean of the
minimum hop distance are lower.
Next, we study the cluster failure scenarios. In particular, we will compare the

46

0.4

Cluster 1: 12 initial node failures
Cluster 2: 17 initial node failures

Blackout size distribution

0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Number of failed communication nodes

Figure 2.7: Blackout size distribution for the two cluster-failure scenarios.
blackout distribution for two clusters (clusters one and two are marked as green
and orange, respectively), as shown in Figure 2.1. Note that both the mean of
the minimum hop and the mean of the maximum degree are higher in cluster two
to those in cluster one. As expected, we can observe in Figure 2.7 that cluster
two is more conducive to cascading-failure than cluster one with higher blackout
distribution during the initial phase of the communication-network node failures.
2.4.4

Simulating the Markov chain of the proposed model

With the proposed interdependency function d, as shown in equation (2.4), in
conjunction with equation (2.5) and (2.6), we simulate the Markov chain of the
proposed model. Our purpose is to validate the IDMC model by comparing its
results to those obtained from the coupled communication and power-grid simulator. To do so, we study the case with three random initial transmission-line
failures. Note that the topological property of the communication network is embedded in the interdependency function, d since d was extracted from simulation
results using the actual communication network topology. Besides, the topological
property of the power system is embedded in the transition stop probability p(xn )

Blackout size distribution (log−log)
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Figure 2.8: Blackout distribution (log-log scale) obtained from simulating the
proposed model and the coupled power-to-communication simulator.
(established in the IDMC model [44] as a bowl shape function). In the simulation
of the IDMC model, we simulate the evolution of the two coupled Markov chains
based on the transition matrix f (sn+1 |sn ), in conjunction with the interdependency function d proposed in Section V, for 106 iterations. For each iteration, the
evolution stops when it reaches an absorbing state. We then average the blackout sizes obtained overall iterations to calculate the blackout size distribution. In
Figure 2.8, we compare the blackout distribution of cascading-failures obtained
empirically by simulating the proposed model with the results obtained from the
coupled communication and power-grid simulator. It is clear that the two results
agree in showing a similar trend in the blackout size distribution. Note that the
results obtained from the coupled simulator are not precise when the number of
failed transmission-lines is large (e.g., over 100), which is due to the limited sample
size of large blackouts. All in all, these results validate that the proposed model is
effective in capturing the impact of the interdependency between the power system and communication network on cascading-failures in the power-grid. Thus,
we have developed a communication-power interdependency function, d that is
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determined by hop distance from a central node, and the degree of the node in the
communication network. This coupling function captures the influence of the communication networks on the power system under different stress levels of the power
grid during cascading-failures. We have devised a coupled power-communication
simulator and conducted extensive simulations to validate the proposed modeling of the coupling function in various cascading-failure scenarios. A key insight
obtained from the simulation results is that the total blackout probability in the
power grid can be significantly impacted by the failures in the communication network when the power grid is under stress. Our simulation results illustrate that
the proposed model is an efficient model to investigate the cascading-failures in the
interdependent power grid. The computational time for simulating the proposed
model is reduced by a factor of 107 to the time using the coupled simulator.
2.5 A Markov-chain based three-layer Model for cascading-failures in smart grids

In this section, we refine the SASE model to capture the influence of the communication network and human operators’ response on the reliability of the power
grid. The Markov chain captures the cascading-failure dynamics in the power grid
in reduced abstract state-space. Each state in the Markov chain corresponds to
a specific state of the power grid. We define the states at which cascading-failure
ends as the absorbing states. When the Markov chain reaches to an absorbing
state, there will be no further failures. The rest of the states of the Markov chain
is termed as cascade-continue states in which cascading-failure will evolve until
it reaches an absorbing state. We also characterize the state transitions for the
Markov chain model in this section using our simulations. Finally, we study the
blackout sizes of the power grid given any initial condition.
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2.5.1

Markov chain based cascading-failure model capturing power,
communication and human factors

Recall that, in the Stochastic Abstract space evolution (SASE) model [5],
cascading-failure evolution was characterized using a Markov chain, which captures the failure dynamics in the power system. In particular, in the SASE model,
a state Si of the Markov chain consisting of three state variables: the transmission
line failures in the system, Xi , maximum capacity of the failed transmission lines
Cimax and a {0, 1}-valued variable termed cascade-stability of the system, Ii , for
which Ii = 0 indicates the system is susceptible to further failures and Ii = 1
indicates that no further failures are possible. Hence, the system has entered a
cascade-stable mode. The operating characteristics considered in the SASE model
[5] are based on power grid simulations, and they include line-tripping threshold,
e, power-grid loading level, r, and the load-shedding constraint level, θ. Power
grid is stressed when the characteristic parameters, r, e, θ are high. Cascade-stop
probability Pstop (Si ), was characterized parametrically in the SASE model using
power system simulations [5]. In work by Wang et al., a new state variable for the
Markov chain, i.e., human operators’ response Hi , was introduced [85]. A coupled
parameter g(Hi ) was introduced to capture the influence of the human operator
on the power grid. Cascade-stop probability Pstop (Si ) was defined parametrically
using an operating characteristic of the power grid while considering the role of
human factors. In the previous section, the power-communication coupling parameter, d is modeled that influence of the communication network on the power
grid. It has been shown that a decrement in the minimum hop distance or an increment in the maximum node degree of the failed communication nodes increases
the cascading-failure probability in the power grid. To this end, we observe from
[5, 44, 62, 85] that using a Markov chain the coupled interactions between different
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Figure 2.9: State transition diagram for the three layer Markov chain
layers’ of the power grid can be explained efficiently.
In this section, we consider IEEE 118-bus topology, which contains 186 transmission lines. Similar to the previous section, we consider the same topology
for the communication network, which has a one-one mapping between power
and communication nodes. In particular, communication nodes are placed at each
substation, and communication links are set along each transmission line. Furthermore, there is one or multiple communication nodes serving as a control center(s)
in the power grid. The power grid operation control center monitors the health of
the power grid and takes supervisory actions based on various events to maintain
optimum power flow in the power transmission layer. For example, Figure 2.1
shows the IEEE 118-bus topology for the power grids and a marked control center
(red circle) in the IEEE 118-bus system. During contingencies, when power grid
disturbances occur, human operators in the control center can reconfigure the system by, for instance, reconfiguring power flow, changing generators’ set points, and
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Table 2.1: Human Operator response levels based on failure in power and communication network
Level
1
2
3
4

Definition
X ≤ 5 and Y ≤ 10
5 < X ≤ 10 and
10 < Y ≤ 30
10 < X ≤ 50
and Y > 30
X > 50

Available action time
Normal

Stress
Normal

Low

High

Extremely low

Extreme

N/A

N/A

shedding a certain amount of load. Load-shedding is usually done either manually
or through an intelligent load-shedding management system (while the communication network plays a key role in implementing the load-shedding decisions) to
balance the power flow [77]. In the three-layers of the Markov chain, we consider
that the absorbing state is associated with the power grid layer because, once a
cascading-failure is initiated, it can stop only when there are no further failures in
the power grid. We evaluate the parameters (Pstop (Si ), di and Hi ) of the current
state (i.e, i) to calculate the state transition probability (described in the next
sub-section) of the next state of the Markov chain.
2.5.2

State transitions

We consider the state variables, Si = (Xi , Yi , Hi , Ii , Ki ) in the three-layer model
to represent an abstract state Si , where Xi is the number of transmission-line
failures in power grid; Yi is the number of communication-link failures; Hi refers
human operator performance level; Ii = power grid stability indicator, a {0,1}
valued binary variable, and Ki is the layer tracking parameter. K is defined as
K = mod(k, 3), k = 0, 1, 2... for the three-layers’ and k increases one step at a time.
At K = 0, the power grid dynamics are evaluated, at K = 1, the communication
network dynamics are assessed, and at K = 2, we estimate the human operator
performance level. We use the coupling parameter, d for communication networks
influence as described in the previous section, and coupling parameter for human
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operation’s influence, g(Hi ) from [85].
Figure 2.9 illustrates the state transitions in the three-layers’ characterizing
cascading-failures in the smart grid. We did not consider any healing during cascade propagation, i.e., failures increase monotonically in the power grid (i.e., Xi
is non-decreasing) and have focused on the negative effects of interdependencies
in this work. We consider that when failures trigger in the power grid, failures in
the communication network and the operator response level (leads to human operator error) also increases monotonically during cascading-failures. From Figure
2.9, we observe that, for a transition from Si to Si+1 state, we go through each
layer of the three-layer system using the layer tracking parameter, K (power grid,
communication network, and human operator response) and evaluate the coupling
parameters. We start the coupling parameters with some initial value conditional
on the initial state (for example, if power grid and communication network is operating with no failures, then d = 0 and g(Hi ) = 0). We calculate Pstop (Si ) with
Xi failures using the following analytic formulation from [5].



i

) +  if 1 ≤ Xi ≤ a2 L
a1 ( a2aL−X


2L


Pstop (Si ) =  if 1 < Xi ≤ 0.6L






Q(Xi ) if 0.6L < Xi ≤ L,

(2.7)

where L is the total number of transmission-lines, Q(Xi ) is a fixed quadratic
function approximating the tail of the family of bowl-shape functions. In our
simulations for the three-layer model we also got similar bowl-shape behavior as
illustrated in Figure 2.10. Without loss of generality Pstop (L) = 1, i.e., there is no
more transmission-line failures when all the transmission lines have failed in the
power grid. Scaling parameters a1 , a2 and  were approximated using the power
grid characteristic parameters (r, e, θ) using the following parametric formulation
obtained from power system simulation presented in [1]:
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0.5
0.4
a1 = 0.4 − 0.25b[r]c0.5 − [e]0.1
(0.2 − [e]0.5
0.1 ) − 0.25d[θ]e

(2.8)

0.4
0.5
a2 = 0.1 − 0.05b[r]c0.5 − 0.1[e]0.5
0.1 (0.2 − [e]0.1 ) − 0.07d[θ]e

(2.9)

0.4
 = 0.6 − 0.4b[r]c0.5 − 0.5[e]0.5
0.1 − 0.3d[θ]e .

(2.10)

Note that, the constants in the scaling parameters a1 , a2 and  are empirically
calculated based on the simulation results (part of the results have been shown
in [6, 5, 1]). When Xi+1 = Xi ; Ii = 0; Ii+1 = 1; Ki+1 = 0; the Markov chain
will have a state transition from a cascade-continue state to an absorbing state
with probability P(Si+1 |Si ) = Pstop (Si ) di g(Hi ) (marked with solid line in Figure
2.9). Here, we took the Cartesian product among the coupling parameters as all
the three coupling parameters are [0,1] valued probability estimates and Cartesian
the product (which is also [0,1] valued) gives a combined state transition from a
cascade-continue state to an absorbing state. Note that, when there are no failures
in the power grid, d = 1 and g(Hi ) = 1.
For Xi+1 = Xi + 1; Ii+1 = Ii = 0; Ki+1 = 0; the Markov chain will be in a
transitory state (marked with dotted line in Figure 2.9) having one new failure in
the power grid, with following transition probability: P(Si+1 |Si ) = 1 - (Pstop (Si )
di g(Hi )). At this stage, we will update the coupling parameters from each layer
for the state i + 1. The status of the current layer is tracked using the layer
tracking parameter, K. With new failures in the power grid and with K = 0, we
calculate Pstop (Si+1 ) using equation (2.7) and update the layer tracking parameter
by one step using K = mod(k + 1, 3). At this stage (K = 1), we will evaluate the
failure dynamics of the communication network and calculate the communicationpower coupling parameter (d) in terms of minimum hop distance of the failed
communication lines and maximum degree of the failed communication nodes
using equation 2.4. Now, at K = 1, if Yi+1 = Yi ; (i.e. there is no fail in the
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communication network) then di+1 = di and if Yi+1 > Yi ; we calculate di+1 using
(2.4) and update the layer tracking parameter by one step using K = mod(k+1, 3).
At this stage (K = 2), we will evaluate the dynamics of the human operation involved in the cascading-failure process and calculate the operator response
level Hi using the hSASE model [1]. Table 5.1 shows the relationship between
the human operator performance level with the power grid and communication
network. We characterize the relation between human operator response due to
failure in the power and communication network in four levels. Here, level 1 indicates normal power grid operation, and level 4 indicates certain failure dynamics
when operators’ cannot stop the cascading-failure due to an excessive number of
failures that have happened already. But the authors in [1] did not consider the
role of communication topology while calculating human operator response. Using
the definition from Table 5.1 (which includes failure in power grid and communication network), we then calculate the HEP using the following formula developed
in [64] (interested readers can refer to [63] [64] where human error probabilities
and their interactions with performance shaping factors (PSF) and nominal HEPs
(NHEP) were described in detail)

HEP (Hi ) = N HEP

2
Y

P SFi .

(2.11)

i=1

In our model, two PSFs have been considered (available action time and stress
level of the operator) for calculating HEP (Hi ). When Hi+1 = Hi , then there is
no change in human operator performance level and If Hi+1 > Hi ; the human
operator stress level is increased and we calculate the new performance level, Hi+1
using g(Hi+1 ) = 1 − b.HEP (Hi+1 ). Here, b is a free scaling parameter [1].
To this end, we have completely evaluated the three coupling parameters that
influence each other. Now, based on whether there will be any new failures in
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Figure 2.10: Cascade-stop probability with and without the influence of communication and human response.
the power grid or not, we again go to an absorbing or transitory state using
the state transition probability and calculate the coupling parameter for the new
state again. This loop of state transition and updating the coupling parameters
continues until the Markov chain goes into an absorbing state.
2.6 Simulation Results

Using our parametric formulation of the state transition dynamics, we now
perform Monte-Carlo simulation with the Markov chain. We consider the IEEE
118-bus power grid topology, which contains 186 transmission lines. We consider
two failures in the power grid and communication network initially (to negate the
N-1 security effect). We assume that if a communication node is failed, the links
connected to that communication node will fail too. The stress level in the power
grid is determined using the power grid characteristics parameter, r (power grid
loading ratio), e (capacity estimator error), θ (load-shedding constraint), which
was introduced in the SASE model [5]. We take blackout size distribution as
the critical parameter to assess the model, which is a widely adopted metric for
assessing cascading-failures [61, 31, 5]. It refers to the blackout probability of
certain transmission lines after the Markov chain enters into an absorbing state
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Figure 2.11: Blackout size (log-log scale) with and without the impact of communication and human operator influence.
under given initial condition ( number of initial failures and power grid operating
characteristic parameters, etc.).
First, Cascade-stop probabilities (with and without the consideration of the
coupling from a communication network and human factors) as a function of
the number of failed transmission lines are shown in Figure 2.10. At this state
of the Markov chain, there will be no further failures, and cascading-failures in
the power grid will stop. The cascade-stop probabilities were calculated when
the power grid is under stress (r = 0.95, e = 0.25, θ = 0.25). From Figure
2.10, it can be observed that cascade stop probability shows bowl shape for both
the cases, which we discussed already in the previous section. However, when
the communication network and human operator response were considered, we
observed low cascade-stop probability as compared to the power-grid-only scenario
for the transmission lines [5]. It illustrates poor human operator performance, and
failure in the communication network can lead to greater blackout size.
Figure 2.11 represents the impact of blackout size for three cases (with no influence, moderate influence, and strong influence from a communication network and
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Figure 2.12: Blackout size (log-log scale) comparison when the grid is not in stress
(r = 0.5, e = 0.1 and θ = 0.1 was considered for no stress scenario).
human operator into the power grid). Here, we considered the coupling parameter
d and H as 0.5 for moderate influence and 0.9 for high influence case. We observe
that without any influence, the blackout size follows an exponential distribution,
while for high deterministic influence, the blackout size follows a power-law distribution. The results obtained from the coupled simulator are not precise when
the number of failed transmission lines is large (e.g., over 100), which is due to
the limited sample size of massive blackouts.
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 represent the probability of blackout when the power
grid is under no stress and under stress, respectively (stress is regulated using the
characteristic parameters of the power grid). We consider four cases, i.e., power
grid only, power and communication coupling, power and human operator response
coupling, and all three-layers’ coupling to analyze the failure propagation and for
blackout size calculation. We observe that blackout size increases significantly
when the power grid is stressed and influenced by the communication network
and human operator response. It is visible from our simulation results that the
blackout size becomes more substantial when the power grid is in stress, and there
are influences from a communication network and human operators’. Figure 2.13
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Figure 2.13: Blackout size (log-log scale) comparison when the grid is under stress.
(r = 0.8, e = 0.2 and θ = 0.2 was considered for stressed scenario).
suggests that blackout size for the three-layer follows power-law distribution after
certain power grid operating parameters, although, for the single and two-layer
interactions, it shows the exponential distribution. From Figure 2.13, we can
see that blackout size distribution for all three-layer (black), and power grid and
communication influence (green) starts leaning to power-law when the number of
transmission line failure is around 50 while in the other two cases it’s exponential.
This is because of the higher influence of communication node failure then human
error. So, blackout sizes can result in reliable (exponential) and unreliable (powerlaw) behavior due to different characteristic parameters’ and coupling between the
3-layers.
In this chapter, we discussed the role of communication and human operator
response level in the cascading failure dynamics in smart grids. However, the
detailed state transition probabilities of the Markov chain are not captured in this
work, which is a major drawback of the work. Again, as each layer of the grids is
considered to have an individual Markov chain, as the network grows, scalability
and tractability becomes a major concern with the IDMC approach, Which leads
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us to develop an alternative solution to be discussed in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3
Correlating grid-operators’ performance with grid variables in
smart-grids during cascading failures

In this chapter, the role of human factors associated with the grid operators, e.g., human-error probability (HEP), is modeled as a function of the grid
conditions as well as operators’ training and experience levels. Moreover, the
HEP is embedded in a previously reported Markov-chain model that generates
the probability distribution of blackout as a function of time following a trigger.
Specifically, through the HEP, the Markov-chain’s transition matrix includes the
dynamics of detailed smart-grid operator attributes. To derive the grid-state dependent HEP, three real-valued performance shaping factors (PSFs), representing
key human attributes of the operators, are mapped to the grid-state variables,
thereby capturing the correlation between the evolution of the PSF levels and
the propagation of transmission-line failures. This mapping is established based
on a histogram-equalization principle, which utilizes the experimentally-estimated
probability distribution of the PSF levels while assuming a monotone relationship
between the HEP values and number of line failures. Further, the distribution of
the PSF levels was used to identify the critical combinations of PSF levels that
correspond to an event with high joint probability as well as a high HEP.
3.1 Introduction

Human operators play a pivotal role in mitigating the propagation of cascading
failures. Human operator error (HEP) during propagation of failures can increase
the probability of a large blackout astronomically. Historical data analysis of large
power-grid blackouts strongly indicates operator error as a critical initiator of
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cascading failures. The 2003 Northeast blackout in the United States and Canada
occurred due to a combination of transmission-line and generating-unit failures,
communication components, and server failures, and ineffective and erroneous
human-operator responses [4]. Hence, studying the interplay between the power
grid and the smart-grid operators during cascading failures is critical in predicting
the reliability of the smart-grid. [15].
In this chapter, we propose a Markov-chain based cascading failure model,
including human operator actions and decisions in the loop. The joint probability
of three PSFs (available time, stress, and complexity of the problem) is used to map
the grid operators’ response levels with the grid states of the Markov chain. The
other five PSFs (experience of the operators, work process, fitness, ergonomics, and
procedures), which are not affected by the propagation of failures, is used as a fixed
initial parameter of the Markov chain for calculating the HEP, i.e., three PSFs
will have varying PSF levels (depending on the grid state of the Markov chain)
multipliers, and five PSFs will have a fixed PSF level and the associated multipliers
during the propagation of failures. Then, the calculated HEP from the PSFs in a
grid state is used to evaluate the probability of cascade stopping (in the Markov
chain), including the role of human operators. Notably, this incorporation of
the correlated and uncorrelated PSFs using our proposed methodology drastically
changes the state transition probabilities of the Markov chain compared to [1],
which now captures the detailed dynamics of the role of smart-grid operators
during cascading failures in the power grid. Finally, we identify a set of critical PSF
level combinations from all the possible events consisting of various combinations
of PSF levels. We show that only considering the HEP without considering the
distribution of the PSFs can be misleading, as in most cases, a combination of PSF
events will lead to high HEP but with very small/zero probability of occurrence.
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3.2 Markov chain based cascading failure model including operator in the loop

3.2.1

State variables and transition matrix of the Markov chain

Using a similar approach reported in [5, 1], the detailed power-grid states in the
same class are represented by a few aggregate state variables. The state variables
defining each equivalence class are the number of transmission-line failures, Fi ,
the maximum capacity of the failed lines Cimax and a human-factor variable, Hi ,
which captures the status of operators’ performance (using PSFs) controlling the
power grid. Notably, the reduced state variables also include a critical variable,
Ii , to capture the complex event of the cascade stopping: if the power grid is
in a cascading mode, then Ii = 0 and the cascade will continue. Conversely, the
cascading failure terminates if the power grid is in an absorbing state, namely when
Ii = 1. The state-dependent cascading-stop probability, Pstop , is parametrically
expressed in terms of power-grid loading level, r, capacity-estimation error, e, and
load-shedding constraint, θ [5].
The transition matrix of the Markov chain is a 2M |C| × 2M |C| matrix, where
M is the total number of failed transmission lines and |C| is the cardinality of the
set of capacities, which in this work is five, and 2 accounts for the binary variable
I. In our model, we do not consider any healing capability, thus, transmissionline failure, Fi , increases monotonically with one failure per unit step. The state
transition probability, f (Sj |Si ), from state Si = (Fi , Cimax , Hi , Ii ) to the next state
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Sj = (Fj , Cjmax , Hj , Ij ), is defined below

f (Sj |Si ) =





1
if Fj = Fi , Cjmax = Cimax , Ij = Ii = 1,








Pstop (Si )g(Hi )








if Fj = Fi , Cjmax = Cimax , Ij = 1,

(3.1)




P (Sj |Si )








if Fj = Fi + 1, Cjmax ∈ C, Ij = 0,







0
otherwise.
Here Pstop (Si ) is the probability of cascade-stop at state Si , and the human
factor variable is mapped explicitly using the Fi and Cimax , which is described in
the following section. We adopt the formulation of Pstop (Si ) from [1] and P (Sj |Si )
from [5] (for details see [5, 1]). Note that g(Hi ) = 1 − HEP(Hi ) is a function that
translates HEP for a specific human operator response into the transition matrix
of the Markov chain. Next, we describe the formulation of HEP.
During the initial triggering phase (precursor phase) of the cascading failures
in the power grid, the status of several power-grid operating parameters (i.e.,
loading level, the capability to implement load shedding, etc.) is critical to trigger cascading failures and to determine the size of the blackout. In addition to
these power-grid operating parameters, the human operator attributes during the
initiation of a cascade play a critical part. For example, in most of the contingency scenarios, operators are equipped with diagnostic procedures to devise a
mitigation strategy, have sufficient time to analyze the problem, and implement
actions accordingly. In [64], the authors used , Standardized Plant Analysis RiskHuman Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) methodology to calculate the HEP for a
given context.The SPAR-H methodology is a simplified approach to human error
quantification that accounts for individual performance-shaping factors that affect
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perception, processing and response to events in complex environments [63].Coauthor Dr. Abreu interviewed system operators from New England and the South
East, and took note of the narratives of the emergencies that happened during
their shift, which is then applied to the SPAR-H methodology to each task and
calculated dependency between the cognitive and action-based tasks. Then they
calculated the final failure probability and compared the empirical evaluation of
error probability with what actually occurred. Using Monte Carlo methods and
the SPAR-H equations, final estimation of the HEP and the frequency associated
with each level was calculated. Detailed step by step SPAR-H description of the
process can be found in [86]. Here the HEP is formulated using the PSFs of the
operators. The PSF multiplier values for a specific operator context was listed in
Table 1 of [64]. Note that, during the cascade triggering phase, each operator dealing with the scenario can possess a specific set of attributes. The probability that
an operator will take a good/bad decision depends on the specific set of attributes.
These attributes refer to various PSF levels in Table 1 in [64]. Specifically, the
human operator attributes were divided into eight different PSFs, each containing
a set of PSF levels. Each PSF level is associated with a multiplier value, which is
used to calculate the HEP quantitatively using (4.2) (adopted from [64]).
Q
NHEP 8i=1 PSFi
HEP =
Q
NHEP( 8i=1 PSFi − 1) + 1

(3.2)

Here NHEP represents the type of operation (diagnosis or action, having a multiplier for each type) performed by the operators. Further, the distribution of the
PSFs (calculated based on grid-operator interviews) are obtained from Table 3 in
[64].
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3.2.2

Mapping between PSFs and the Markov chain state-space

A key objective of this work is to find a data-driven mapping between power
grid states and the PSFs using the distribution of the PSFs. The operator attributes can be characterized using various combinations of the PSF levels, and
depending on the combinations, the HEP during the initial triggering phase of a
cascading failure event can vary between zero and one. The PSFs such as available
time, stress, and complexity are correlated with the grid conditions. Specifically,
it is intuitive that as the failures propagate, available time to react for an operator
would be less, the stress on operators to mitigate the contingency would be high,
and the complexity of the problem would become more complicated. On the other
hand, performance shaping factors such as ergonomics, the fitness of the operators,
availability of the procedures, experience of the operators, and work processes do
not change during the propagation of the failures. Although these factors do not
correlate with the propagation of failures, they are critical and plays a significant
role in quantifying the HEP. For example, from Table 1 in [64], when the available
time is inadequate, or the operator is unfit to work, the human error probability
is one, which indicates that an unfit worker or an operator with inadequate time
would certainly make an error.
As described in the related works, Wang et al. used two PSFs (available time
and stress) and coarsely mapped grid states with the operator levels (Table 2 in
[1]). However, as the operators’ response is quantized in four operating levels
only (each associated with different PSF multipliers as shown in Table 2 in [1]),
there is a limited variation of the human error probability. To overcome this
serious limitation, we use all the eight PSFs reported in [64] and their associated
multipliers for calculating the HEP. Specifically, we judiciously use the three PSFs
(available time, stress, and complexity) that are correlated with the propagation of
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failures to define the operator response levels using the power-grid state variables.
Note that available time, stress, and complexity has four, three, and four PSF
levels, respectively. Thus, we have forty-eight (4×3×4) distinct combinations of
these PSF levels, i.e., forty-eight distinct operators’ response levels compared to
only four responses in [1]. The distribution of each PSFs is available in [64].
The joint probability mass function of the PSF’s is calculated using the following
equation:

F(PSF1 , ..., PSFn ) = P{PSF1 ≤ psf 1 , ..., PSFn ≤ psf n }

(3.3)

Here psf 1 , ..., psf n represents the PSF levels for an individual PSF. In this work,
we assume that the PSFs are uncorrelated, i.e., the likelihood that a PSF is independent of the other PSFs. Thus, we can calculate the joint probability mass
function from their marginal mass functions using the following equation:

F(PSF1 , ..., PSFn ) =

n
Y

F(PSFi )

(3.4)

i=1

Using (3) and (4), we calculate the joint probability for each of the forty-eight
combinations of PSFs. To map these events into the state space of the Markov
chain, we first determine the size of the Markov chain from the state variables.
Similar to [5, 1], we use the IEEE 118-bus system, which has 186 transmission
lines. The flow capacity in transmission lines is quantized to obtain a set of five
transmission line capacities, C ={20MW, 80MW, 200MW, 500MW, 800MW},
and each transmission line is assigned with capacity according to their power-flow
capacities. Including the binary absorbing/continuity variable, the state space
of the transition matrix is 1860×1860 where the index of a specific state of the
Markov chain can be calculated as using, (Fi − 1)|Cimax | + 2(Cimax − 1) + Ii + 1.
To map the forty-eight operator response levels to 1860 grid states, we use the
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Table 3.1: Mapping of Operator response levels with PSF levels and grid variables
(nominal PSF levels considered for the other PSFs)
Operators response
level 1
level 2
level 3
level 4
level 5
...
level 47
level 48

available time
expansive time
expansive time
expansive time
expansive time
extra time
...
barely time
barely time

stress
nominal
high
extreme
nominal
nominal
...
high
extreme

complexity
obvious diagnosis
obvious diagnosis
obvious diagnosis
nominal
obvious diagnosis
...
moderately complex
highly complex

HEP
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
...
0.5025
0.7163

joint probability
0.0000528
0.0000248
0.000024
0.0000924
0.001584
...
0.008442
0.001386

grid state(Fi ,Cimax ), index
(1,20), 1
(1,20), 1
(1,20), 1
(1,20)-(1,80), (1-3)
(1,200), 5
...
(185,500), 1847
(185,800), 1849

Table 3.2: Detailed Grid variable and HEP mapping
C max = 20
C max = 80
C max = 200
C max = 500
C max = 800

F=1
0.0000
0.0001
0.0002
0.0006
0.0010

F=2
0.0010
0.0010
0.0010
0.0010
0.0010

F=3
.0010
0.0010
0.0010
0.0010
0.0010

...
...
...
...
...
...

F=185
0.5025
.5025
.5025
.5025
.7163

F=186
1
1
1
1
1

histogram equalization technique [78]. First, we calculate the HEPs for the operator response levels. Then we sort HEP from low to high. We assume that HEP
increases monotonically with the grid index, i.e., more failures in the grid, and the
higher value of maximum capacity will increase HEP. Then we multiply the joint
PSF probability with 1850 (maximum StateIndex10 for IEEE 118-bus system)
and round it to the nearest integer value to map the operator response levels to
the grid StateIndexes as shown in Table 5.1. Finally, when all the transmission
lines fail, i.e., for the last ten StateIndexes, the HEP of one is assigned since all
the lines have failed already. Note that we only take the odd grid StateIndexes
since the even states represent the absorbing states. Finally, if multiple operator
responses are mapped to a single grid state (due to very low joint probability), we
assign the average HEP (of those response levels) for that state. With this, the
detailed grid state mapping with HEP is complete, and a snapshot (with nominal
multipliers of the five uncorrelated PSFs) is shown in Table 3.2.
At the starting state, the grid operators would be attributed to various PSF
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Figure 3.1: HEP distribution and joint probability of PSFs
levels along with the power-grid operating parameters. The five PSFs that are
uncorrelated to the propagation of failures would remain unchanged during the
cascading failures. However, the other three PSFs would change PSF levels following the power-grid state variables. Compared to [1], this approach will allow
the inclusion of the detailed operator PSF levels, which in turn will allow having
various HEPs, which was only four in [1].
3.3

Results

In this section, we share the results and capabilities of this model.
3.3.1

Critical PSF combinations that lead to high HEP

A striking observation from the distribution of the PSFs (adopted from Table
3 in [64]) is that not all the combinations of PSFs are equally likely to occur. For
example, all the operators reported that their fitness was nominal, which implies
that although there are three distinct PSF levels for fitness (nominal, degraded
fitness, unfit), the probability of human operator attribute with a degraded fitness
or unfit is zero. This observation is very significant in the sense that not all the
32400 events (a combination of PSF levels, each giving a HEP) have a non-zero
probability of occurrence. In fact, using Table 3 of [64], we observe that from the
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32400 events, only 3888 events have a non-zero probability of occurring (represents
88% of all the events). Thus, calculating HEP without considering the distribution
of the PSFs can be misleading, since the PSF distributions are non-uniform. From
the HEP values calculated using equation (4.2) for all the 32400 events, we can
observe that 61% events have human error probability greater than 0.9. However,
the joint distribution (considering independence between PSFs) of the PSFs using
the PSF distributions tells that only 12% of the total events have a non-zero
probability of occurrence. We plot the HEP (left vertical axis) and the probability
of the event occurring (right vertical axis) with the PSF index (calculated using
combinations of PSF multipliers) in Figure 3.1 Note that, to visualize the HEP
and the probability of the event occurring against various combinations of PSF
levels in two dimensions, we use the following equation to transform the eightdimensional PSF levels into a two dimensional PSF index using the table 1 in [1].
The coefficient values in the following equation depends on the number of PSF
levels. In total, when the maximum PSF levels are considered for all the PSFs the
total number of events will add up to 32400 as mentioned above.
index = 10800(fitnessi − 1) + 2160(availabletimei − 1) + 432
(proceduresi − 1) + 108(ergonomicsi − 1) + 36(stressi − 1)

(3.5)

+9(complexityi − 1) + 3(experiencei − 1) + workprocessi
Observe that the grey colored bar plot in Figure 3.1 represents HEP calculated
using equation (4.2), where the PSF multiplier values are taken from Table 5.1
of [64]. Clearly, the grey bar, which represents the HEP is one for many indexes
(≥0.9 for %61 cases), which seems exaggerated. However, the blue bar plot reveals
that only a handful of those events have a non-zero probability of occurrence. The
combination of HEP and distribution of PSFs can be used to identify the critical
combination of PSF events that have a high probability of occurring with a high

blackout-size distribution
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of blackout size between the proposed model and hSASE
model [4].

HEP. We have shown an example of the critical combination of PSF events in Table
3. Here we have considered events that have HEP ≥ 0.01 and the probability
of that event occurring ≥ 0.01. Table 3 reveals that there are only 12 events
filtered using these criteria. This information is critical because it indicates that,
in general, the probability of an event with high HEP is unlikely. Hence, using
this approach, one can quickly identify the combinations of the PSF events (with
a high HEP) that are highly likely to occur.
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3.3.2

Comparison of blackout size with hSASE model [1]

We show a comparison between the blackout size distributions obtained using
the proposed and the hSASE model in Figure 3.2. We simulate the Markov chain
numerically for both cases with the same initial conditions (Fi =2, r=0.85, e=0.2,
θ=0.2). In our proposed model, we consider the detailed mapping of HEP with the
grid variables, as shown in Table 3.2. Observe that, in Figure 3.2, the blackout
size distribution in the proposed model is exponential in contrast to power-law
distribution in the hSASE model. Since the hSASE model considers a coarse
mapping between operator attributes and grid variables without considering the
distribution of the PSFs, HEP is generally higher when the number of transmission
line failures in the power grid is high. For example, in the hSASE model, the
authors considered an inadequate time for the operators’ when the number of
transmission line failures was greater than fifty for the IEEE 118-bus system. In
contrast, in the proposed model, even if there are high transmission line failures in
the power grid, HEP is less than one. HEP is one only when all the transmission
lines have failed, and there is nothing an operator can do. Else, operator response
levels are mapped accordingly using the joint probability of the PSFs. In Figure
3.2, we have used nominal PSF multipliers for the five uncorrelated PSFs as an
initial condition and then mapped HEP with grid variables. For this setting,
the blue plot (hSASE) shows power-law, while the Orange plot (proposed model)
shows exponential behavior. Changing the uncorrelated PSFs from nominal to
high or extreme would increase the initial HEP, and hence the more drastic impact
of human error is observed. This capability is not available in [1] since it does not
consider the uncorrelated PSFs. This approach is more realistic because even
if there are a high number of transmission line failures due to cascading, grid
operators often successfully save the remaining lines by implementing effective
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strategies. Thus, the proposed work adds more fidelity compared to the hSASE
model.
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Chapter 4
Balancing Smart Grid’s Performance Enhancement and Resilience
to Cyber Threat

The strong interplay between the power grid and the corresponding communication and control network plays a pivotal role in the resilience of the smart grid.
In this work, the dynamics of the interdependence among smart-grid subsystems
such as the power grid, communication network, and response of human operators
are captured during the propagation of cascading failures. A previously developed Markov-chain based model is refined into an interdependent Markov chain
model to capture the role of cyber threat from the communication network and
the human-operator error during cascading failures. The state transitions of the
Markov chain are parameterized by the critical operating parameters of the power
grid. The calculations assume a generic form of correlation between the level of
and damage from cyber-attacks, on the one hand, and the level of interdependence on the other hand. The model finds the optimal level of interdependence,
i.e., the trade-off between well-informed control and vulnerability to attacks that
minimizes the probability of massive cascading failures in power grids. There is
a point of diminishing return beyond which the harm of exposure to cyber threat
outweighs the benefits of information.
A schematic of an interdependent smart-grid system that integrates the powergrid, the communication network, and the human-operators, as well as cyber attackers in the loop is shown in Figure 4.1 (with details of each variable and parameters described subsequently). In this chapter, we refine a previously developed
single-layer Markov-chain based analytical cascading failure model to an interdependent Markov chain model. We term it as the model for Cascading Failures in
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Figure 4.1: An interdependent smart grid that integrates the power-grid, the
communication network (with cyber attackers), and the grid operators.
Interdependent Stochastic Abstract State-space Evolution (I-SASE). The I-SASE
model can capture the benefits of having more information through the capability
of implementing load shedding during contingencies. However, with more powercommunication interdependence, the grid becomes vulnerable to cyber-attacks
through the communication channels. We use the model to find the optimal interdependence between the power grid and communication network that minimizes
the risk of massive blackouts by taking the potential risk of a cyber-attack into
account.
4.1 I-SASE Analytic Framework

The I-SASE model analytic framework depends on the three layers of the smart
grid. In this section, we discuss the role of each layer on the dynamics of cascading
failures.
4.1.1

Influence of the communication network on the propagation of
cascading failures

Figure 4.2 shows the interdependence between the power grid and the communication network used in our model. We consider that the power grid and the
communication network can have different topologies; however, one power node
can be connected with one communication node to share the grid information to
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Figure 4.2: A schematic diagram showing the inter-connectivity between the power
grid and the communication network in smart grids
the control center, i.e., if the power grid has N nodes (buses) then we can have
max
a maximum N power-communication interconnections, Npc
. Increased inter-

dependency through the interconnections gives additional information and hence
reliability through informed control. Power-communication interconnections, Npc ,
aids human operators to actuate system-wide control actions to mitigate the risk
and spread of cascading failures [7]. However, interconnections come at the price
of higher infrastructure cost as well as the cost to minimize the risk of cyber
threat through the interconnections. Thus, the security risk of the system can be
minimized by integrating better security policies that require higher costs. In realworld scenarios, SCADA networks connect many, but not all, nodes in a power
network over communication networks using fiber-optic, microwave, and telephone
max
communication channels combined [7]. Hence, in practice, Npc ≤ Npc
.

Note that Figure 4.2 (left) and 4.2 (right) show four interconnections between
the power grid and communication network in two different ways. With this
connectivity structure at hand, we discuss the role of the communication network during the propagation of failures. The ratio of power-communication interconnections and maximum number of power-communication interconnections
max
is k = Npc /Npc
∈ [0, 1]. A higher value of k indicates strong interactions be-

tween the power grid and communication network. While some of the similar
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interdependent models consider that failure in a power node initiates failure in
the communication network with some probability [44], in this chapter, we do
not consider failures in the communication network directly rather we capture the
influence of disturbance in power grid on communication network indirectly. We
consider that transmission line failures in the power grid can trigger the corresponding power node (bus) failure and when all the transmission lines that are
connected to a power node fail, we consider the corresponding power node as failed.
When a power node fails, we assume that the corresponding interconnection has
also failed. Thus, with power node failures, less information on the grid will be
available to the control operators. Here we assume that the intra-interactions inside a communication network is uncorrelated with any incident in the power grid.
The communication nodes are protected using back up power provided through
batteries. Thus, failures in the power node do not necessarily initiate failures in
the communication node. Note that the study of intra-interactions inside a communication network (see Figure 4.2), failures in communication nodes, and their
influence on the power grid are beyond the scope of this work.
Similar to [5], we consider θ ∈ [0,1] as the load-shedding constraint, i.e., the
ratio of uncontrollable loads (loads at which load shedding cannot be performed)
and the total load in the power grid. In [5], the authors consider θ as a fixed
parameter. However, in this work, we consider θ as a dynamic parameter that is
inversely correlated with k, i.e., when k = 1, θ = 0 and when k = 0, θ = 1. This
max
indicates that, when Npc = Npc
, there are no load-shedding constraint. On the

contrary, when Npc = 0, we cannot implement any load-shedding in the power
grid. Load-shedding constraint increases with failures of power-communication
interconnections since communication sensors cannot send measurement data and
control signals cannot be sent through the failed power-communication interconnections. To capture the dynamics of load-shedding constraints during cascading
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failures, we define θ as

θi = θini +

klFi
,
max
Npc

(4.1)

where θini = 1-k. Here Fi is the number of failed transmission line in the power
grid due to contingency, and l = N/M, where N is the number of power nodes
(buses) and M is the number of transmission lines. At this point, intuitively we
can correlate that increasing power-communication interconnections causes θini to
decrease. Thus, having a maximum level of power-communication interconnections
would increase flexibility to implement necessary control actions by the power grid
operators during contingencies.
However, power-communication interconnections couple the power grid and
communication network into a single large network, which causes the network to be
susceptible to attacks. The probability of human operator errors due to additional
information processing, the vulnerability of the communication network, noise in
the communication channel, probability of intentional cyber-attacks increases with
the number of Npc . This assumption is very intuitive and yet realistic since having
more interconnection increases the likelihood of exposure to the entire network. To
capture this phenomenon, we introduce a cybersecurity threat parameter, ψ, which
captures the vulnerability of a single large network. The parameter ψ depends on
the number of interconnections (Npc ), and a large number of interconnections
would imply more opportunities for attackers to breach the security of the data.
Therefore, the parameter ψ can be modeled reasonably as


exp(γlFi ) − 1
,
ψi = λk 1 −
max ) − 1
exp(γNpc

(4.2)

where γ ∈ [0,1] is a constant that shapes the exponential function, and λ ∈
[0,1] is a constant used to capture the probability of cyber threat due to added

78

(a) θ

(b) ψ

Figure 4.3: (a) Changes in load shedding constraint and (b) the probability of
cyber threat due to power failures and k=0.6.
interdependence between power and communication network. Note that when
there are no failures in the power grid, ψi = λk, i.e., the probability of cyber
threat depends on the Npc and λ. When failures propagate in the power grid
during a cascade, the probability of a cyber threat decreases as the size of the
power grid decreases due to failures in the power nodes and Npc . Note that the
assumed linear and exponential relationships for θi and ψi can be any arbitrary
monotone function, respectively.
4.1.2

Influence of the human operators’ on the propagation of cascading failures

Human operators play a pivotal role in mitigating the propagation of failures.
During everyday operation, operators/engineers need to tackle various contingencies to improve the reliability of the grid. A key part of the job of a power grid
operator is working under stress and time constraint. In most cases, power grid
operators can implement control mechanisms according to the prescribed plan to
minimize the effect of any contingencies. However, human operator error during
propagation of failures can increase the probability of a large blackout exponentially. Wang et al. introduced a Markov chain framework to integrate the proba-
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bility of human errors into the state-space of the Markov chain transition matrix.
Specifically, the authors [1] quantize human operator errors in four distinguishable
levels and use the state variables of the Markov chain to define the transition between human operator error levels. This work used a previous work [64] by Abreu
et al., where they used eight performance shaping factors (PSFs) to define the
attributes of human operation and used the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Human (SPAR-H) methodology to calculate the human error probability analytically. Abreu et al. calculated the probability distribution of the PSFs empirically
using grid operator interviews.
In this chapter, we use an earlier reported work from chapter 3 that represents the role of operators’ performance shaping factors (PSFs), and human-error
probability (HEP) as a function of the smart grid operating conditions, such as
available time, complexity, and human performance attributes, e.g., stress, training, and working environment. Specifically, the Markov-chains transition matrix
includes the dynamics of the smart-grid operator attributes through the HEP.
The mapping between grid conditions and operator response levels utilizes the
probability distribution of the PSF levels and is established based on a histogramequalization principle, assuming a monotone relationship between the HEP values
and number of line failures. The work allows one to calculate the HEP for each
grid state of the Markov chain conditional on the PSFs (see [87] for details).
4.1.3

State variables of the Markov chain

Similar to the SASE model [5], the state space of the I-SASE model is defined
as Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ii ); where Fi , Cimax , Ii are the states variables of the Markov
chain. Here, Fi is the number of transmission-line failures at state Si . To be
consistent with [5], we also allow one transmission-line failure in our Markov chain
at a time, i.e., during cascading failure we consider a minimal time interval such
that only one new failure can occur in that period. The variable Cimax represents
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the maximum capacity of the failed transmission lines at the current state, and
Ii is the cascade stability indicator. In this work, we also use the same set of five
capacities used in [5]. In addition to the load shedding constraint (θ) parameter,
we use two additional parameters; the power grid loading level, r, which is defined
as the ratio of the total load demand and the generation capacity of the power grid
[5] and the capacity-estimation error, e, which represents the error (at the control
center) in estimating the actual capacity of the transmission lines. A higher value
of r is indicative of stress on the power grid from [5]. In our Markov-chain model,
parameter e is used to determine overloaded lines, a parameter that naturally
affects cascading failures profoundly.
4.1.4

Probability transition matrix

The transition matrix of the Markov chain is a 2M |C|×2M |C| matrix, where M
is the total number of failed transmission lines and |C| is the cardinality of the set
of capacities. In our model, the number of transmission-line failure, Fi , increases
monotonically with one failure per unit time since no healing of the nodes/lines
were considered. Hence, the transition matrix P is a row-stochastic upper diagonal
matrix. The state transition probability, f (Sj |Si ), from state Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ii )
to the next state Sj = (Fj , Cjmax , Ij ), is defined below:

f (Sj |Si ) =




1 if Fj = Fi , Cjmax = Cimax , Ij = Ii = 1,








Pstop (Si )(1 − ψi )(1 − hi )





if Fj = Fi , Cjmax = Cimax , Ij = 1,







P (Sj |Si ) if Fj = Fi + 1, Cjmax ∈ C, Ij = 0,







0
otherwise.

(4.3)

Here Pstop (Si ) is the probability of cascade-stop at state Si , and P (Sj |Si ) is
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the probability of a new transmission-line failure. The parameters ψi and hi
capture the role of cyber-security threat and human operator error, respectively.
Cascading failures stop when the Markov chain reaches to an absorbing state, i.e.,
the chain reaches a terminal state with Pstop (Si ) = 1. Note that Pstop (Si ) is the key
parameter that dominates the dynamics of I-SASE model and the characterization
of Pstop (Si ) was discussed extensively in [5].
Following [5], Pstop (Si ) is defined as a weighted combination of Pstop (Fi ) (probability of cascade-stop with Fi failures) and Pstop (Cimax ) (probability of cascade-stop
with capacity Ci ) as follows,
Pstop (Si ) = wPstop (Fi ) + (1 − w)Pstop (Cimax ),

(4.4)

where we use w = 0.5. Note that Pstop (Fi ) has a bowl-shape pattern with three
distinguishable phases each defining three phases of a cascading failure as [5]

Pstop (Fi ) =




−Fi

)+
a1 ( a2aM2 M





if 1 ≤ Fi ≤ a2 M,

 if a2 M < Fi ≤ 0.6M,






Q(Fi ) if 0.6M < Fi ≤ M,

(4.5)

where Q(Fi ) is a fixed quadratic function approximating the tail of the family of
bowl-shape functions (see Figure 4 in [5]). Moreover, Pstop (M ) = 1, i.e., there are
no more transmission-line failures if Fi = M . Following the formulation shown in
[1], a reasonable parametric model for the scaling parameters a1 and a2 and  is

a1 = max(0.02, 0.4 − 0.25brc0.5 − [e]00.5 (0.2 − [e]0.5
0.1 ) − 0.25θi )
0.5
a2 = max(0.01, 0.1 − 0.05brc0.5 − 0.1[e]0.5
0.1 (0.2 − [e]0 ) − 0.07θi )

 = max(0.01, 0.6 − 0.4brc0.5 − 0.5[e]0.5
0 − 0.3θi ).

(4.6)
(4.7)
(4.8)
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Similarly, power-grid simulations show that Pstop (Ci )is high (low) when the capacity of the failed transmission line is low (high). Hence, Pstop (Ci ) is defined
as
(
Pstop (Ci ) = max a3

 max{C} − C max 4
i

max{C}

)
, a4 .

(4.9)

Following the power grid simulations described in [5, 1], a reasonable parametric
model for the scaling parameters a3 and a4 is
0.5
a3 = max 0.02, 0.4 − 0.2brc0.5 − [e]0.5
0 (0.2 − [e]0.1 ) − 0.3θi



a4 = max 0.01, 0.1 − 0.06brc0.5 − 0.1[e]00.5 (0.2 − [e]0.5
0 ) − 0.06dθi e

(4.10)



(4.11)

Note that, the constants in the scaling parameters a1 , a2 , ,a3 , and a4 are empirically calculated based on the simulation results (part of the results have been
shown in [6, 5, 1]).
Transition probabilities, P (Sj |Si ) of the Markov chain, are calculated as follows:

P (Sj |Si ) =





Pcont (Si )(1 − Phc (Si ))





if Cjmax = Cimax ,

w(C max )

j
Pcont (Si )Phc (Si ) P

m:Cm >C max w(Cm )

i





if Cjmax > Cimax ,

(4.12)

where Pcont (Si ) = 1 − Pstop (Si )(1 − ψi )(1 − hi ) and


Phc (Si ) = min 1, α(Fi + β)3 ,

(4.13)

where α and β are constants. Moreover, Phc (Si ) is the transition probability
to a state with higher capacity and the w(Ck )’s are capacity weight parameters
calculated from power grid simulations in [5] . We adopt the formulation of the
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human-error probability from [87] and ψi using (4.2), and after each failure in the
power grid, we update the parameter θi parameter using (4.1).
4.2 Results

The parametric model in [5] is tuned to the IEEE 118-bus topology. In the
following calculations, we use the same topology with 118 power nodes and 186
transmission lines.
4.2.1

Pstop (Si ) and blackout size distribution for various k

Cascade-stop probabilities (for k=0.1, k=0.5 and k=0.9) and the distribution
of blackout size (for k=0.1, k=0.5, and k=0.9) as a function of the number of
failed transmission lines are shown in Figure 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. Note that
in Figure 4.5 the hump at the tail of the distribution for k=0.9 indicates the heavy
tail nature of the distribution for high power-communication inter-connectivity.
The cascade-stop probabilities were calculated for the same initial conditions with
two transmission line failures by simulating the Markov chain. From Figures 4.4
and 4.5, it can be observed that for k=0.5, the cascade stop probability is higher
compared to the other two cases, and the blackout size distribution is less severe
when k=0.5. This indicates that when power-communication interdependency is
either very high or very low, there is an added probability of a large blackout.
4.2.2

Optimal power-communication interdependency

From the I-SASE model formulation, it can be observed that with transmission
line failures in the power grid, the parameters θ and h increases, and ψ decreases.
This is intuitive but informative. Failures in the power grid reduce the capability
of implementing load-shedding during cascade propagation. Also, failures in the
power grid increase the probability of human-operator error. On the other hand,
failure in the power grid reduces the communication-power interdependency since
the corresponding power-communication interconnection also fails. Due to this in-
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Figure 4.4: Cascade stop probability for k = 0.5 and 0.9. For k = 0.5, Pstop is
high initially compared to k= 0.9, which indicates that the probability of a large
cascade for k = 0.5 is lower. To visualize the effect of cascade stop probability,
the y-axis is truncated from [0,1] to [0,0.2]

Figure 4.5: Distribution of the blackout size for k = 0.1, k = 0.5 and k = 0.9. For
k = 0.1 and k = 0.9, blackout size distribution shows heavy tail, which indicates
a power law distribution as compared to an exponential distribution for k = 0.5.
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Figure 4.6: Optimal power-communication interdependency with and without cyber threat. Without cyber threat, E[Fi |S0 ] increases with k with minimum at k
= 1. Including the cyber-security parameter, ψi , E[Fi |S0 ] is minimum when k =
0.5.
verse nature, there exists an optimal power-communication interdependency that
minimizes the expected number of transmission line failures given an initial condition, E[Fi |S0 ] subject to 0 ≤ θ, ψ, h ≤ 1 and for a given grid condition during
cascade initiation. In Figure 4.6, we plot the average transmission line failures
for various k with and without considering the effect of cyber threat. Here we
consider r = 0.6 and e = 0.1 for all the cases. It is clearly visible from Figure 4.6
that the optimal power-communication interdependency is when k = 0.5 (24 line
failures in the square marked blue line). However, when we do not consider the
cyber-threat effect, the average transmission line failures were minimum (5 in the
triangle marked orange line) when the power-communication interdependency is
maximum, i.e., k = 1, which was also reported in [7].
A comparison of the effect of various levels of power-communication interdependency on cascading failures between [7] and I-SASE model is shown in Figure
4.7. Figure 4.7 (a) is adopted from [7] and 4.7 (b) using the I-SASE model. the
Y-axis in Figure 4.7 (a) represents the % of loads served after the cascade ends.
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f represents various % of initial line failures. The ideal case (represented by the
black line) represents scenario when communication failures does not effect power
failures. The vulnerable case (represented by the blue line) represents the work in
[21], where failure in power has deterministic impact on communication. The intermediate case (represented by the red line) represents the work by Korkali et al.
where failures in communication fails power nodes probabilistically. If we follow
the red line in 4.7 (a), we can see that as the interdependency is increased, the %
of loads served after the cascade ends increases and maximum is found when the
interdependence is one. In Figure 4.7 (b) we show the results obtained using the
I-SASE model. We assume a linear correlation between the % of average survived
lines with % of load served. If we don’t consider cyber threat (represented by
the orange line), we also obtain the similar result as reported in [7]. However,
our model has the additional capability of capturing the harm of excessive communication and cyber threat. If cyber threat is considered, then we see that the
% of average survived lines increases initially (represented by the grey line) with
increase in interdependence, however, there exists a point of diminishing return
beyond which the harm of communication outweighs the benefits of communication.
The knowledge of this trade-off between benefits and risks of having more
information (optimal power-communication interdependence) can be used as a
useful design parameter to mitigate cascading failures in the smart grid.
4.2.3

Role of operators performance on the propagation of cascading
failures

Note that in the transition matrix of the I-SASE model, the role of humanoperator error is captured through parameter hi (multiplying hi with Pstop (Si )).
The model in [87] correlates the human error probability with the states of the
Markov chain, i.e., for every transitory state of the Markov chain, we have an
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.7: Comparison of the effect of various levels of power-communication
interdependency reported in [7] and I-SASE model (a) % of served loads after cascade ends for various interdependency levels (adopted from [7]) (b) % of survived
lines for various interdependency levels using I-SASE model
associated human error probability which is governed by the PSFs of the operator.
Failures in the power grid increase HEP monotonically, and the formulation is
described extensively in [87]. In Figure 4.8, we show the role of human operator
error on cascading failures. We simulate the Markov chain considering two line
failures and the same initial values of the r, e, k parameters as in the previous
section. In Figure 4.8, we show two plots, one with extreme PSF levels (orange)
and the other with nominal PSF levels (blue). Note that although the other
parameters of the Markov chain are same, various initial PSF levels can exist
due to the different level of experience of the operator, ergonomics, work process,
operating procedure availability, and so forth. In addition, during the propagation
of failures, PSFs such as available time, stress, and complexity changes, which
make the HEP dynamic and state dependant. Observe from the distribution of
the blackout size in Figure 4.8 that, for nominal PSFs (24 lines failures on average),
the effect of cascading failures is less severe compared to the extreme PSFs (32
lines failures on average).
4.3 Cyber threat and operator error aware stochastic model for cascading failures

In this section, we refine the I-SASE model further, which captures the benefits
and risk of information through the communication network. Specifically, we
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Figure 4.8: Distribution of the blackout size for Nominal and extreme HEP and
k=0.5, Fi =2. E[Fi |S0 ] for nominal and extreme HEPs are 24 and 32 lines respectively.
introduce the cyber threat variable as a state variable of the Markov chain to
capture the detailed dynamics of the affect of cyber threat.
4.3.1

State variables of the Markov chain

We consider the following three state variables of the Markov chain: Fi , the
number of transmission line failures at state Si ; Cimax , the maximum capacity
of the failed transmission liens at state Si ; Ψi , the level of cyber threat in the
communication network, and Ii , a binary variable indicating whether the state is
an absorbing or transitory state in a Markov chain. Thus the state space of the
model is defined using Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ψi , Ii ). Index of a state is defined using
2|C||Ψ|(Fi − 1) + 2|Ψ|Cimax + 2(Ψi − 1) + Ii + 1, where |C| is the cardinality of
the set of capacities and |Ψ| is the cardinality of the set of cyber threat models.
For example, in IEEE 118- bus network, the total number of transmission line,
M = 186, considering |C| = 5 and |Ψ| = 5, there are 5580 distinct states of the
Markov chain. Similar to [5], we consider one failure transitions in the Markov
chain, i.e., the overall duration of the cascading failures is divided in such a short
time (∆T ) such that only one failure is allowed. In addition to the state variables,
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three power grid parameters are used to define the transition probabilities of the
Markov chain. We also consider the three parameters used in [5] to model the
state transitions, the ratio between the load and the maximum generation in the
grid, r; the uncertainty in the flow of information, i.e., the error in estimating
the power flow in transmission lines namely capacity-estimation error,e and the
constraint over implementing load shedding in the grid, θ. However, we also
consider the dynamics of system operator error and a cyber threat for modeling
the state transitions, which is not considered in [5]. In that sense, our model is
a generalization of [5], and if we consider fixed parameter values for r, e, θ and do
not consider cyber threat and operators’ error, our model collapses to the original
SASE model.
4.3.2

Effect of interdependency among the various layers of the power
grid

Interdependence between power grid and the associated communication network can lead to three scenarios contributing cascading failures: (1) effective handing of information can minimize cascading failures, (2) increased communication
capability also adds vulnerability to the grid in the form of cyber-attacks and (3)
the incorrect actions of the system operators dealing with cascading events can
lead to further escalation of the event. In the following subsections, we describe
the interactions among various layers of the power grid and model their influence
on cascading failures.
The information on the grid is conveyed to the control center through the
communication network infrastructure. The topology of the grid and the communication network are not necessarily identical. However, power grid nodes ( i.e.,
substations) are equipped with communication facilities to send (receive) information (instructions). Not necessarily all the grid nodes are connected individually
to communication networks. Supervisory control and data acquisition, a com-
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puter system (SCADA) networks connect power and communication nodes using
different mediums (e.g., fiber, microwave) and use this interconnection to collect
information of all the nodes of the grid [7]. Figure 4.12 shows two such examples
of inter-connectivity between the power grid and communication network. With
this setting, we consider maximum inter-connectivity when all the power grid has
an associated interconnection, i.e., if the grid has N nodes (buses), then there can
max
. Power-grid
be a maximum of N power-communication interconnections, Npc

system operators use these interconnections, Npc , to send appropriate control actions to maintain stable health of the grid [7]. Intuitively, the maximum number of
interconnections should maximize the availability of all the information. However,
in practice, due to constraints on communication infrastructure cost and cost of
max
hardening the communication network from cyber threats, Npc ≤ Npc
. We refer

level of power-communication inter-connectivity, k as the ratio between powermax
communication interconnection to it’s maximum,i.e., k = Npc /Npc
∈ [0, 1], where

a higher value to k indicates stronger inter-connectivity. Failure of interconnection is considered as loss of information. While some literature considers a direct
effect of failures in the communication network on the power grid [44, 7] during
cascading events, others argue that the effect of failures in the communication
network is independent of failures in power grid and are uncorrelated. In this
work, we consider that loss of information during cascading failures is initiated
from power node failures. Communication nodes are equipped with backup power
through batteries. Since cascading failures happen in a short duration in time,
the probability of a communication node failure due to a transmission line/ power
node failure is highly unlikely, i.e., the intra-connectivity within the communication network is independent of any incidents in the power grid. Transmission
line failures increase the probability of a power node (bus) failure. When all the
transmission lines associated with power nodes fail, we consider the failure of a
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Figure 4.9: A flowchart for mapping HEP with the state variables of the Markov
chain
power-communication interconnection.
System operators influence on the reliability of power grids
From preventive maintenance to protective actions, system operators are actively
involved in managing the health of the grid and mitigating any risk that can lead
to an outage scenario. However, errors in the decision during contingencies by
the system operators can lead to a larger blackout than usual. System operators
have to deal with contingencies under time constraints, stress, and the complexity of the problem varies significantly. Again, factors such as experience, work
process, procedures, ergonomics, fitness can affect the capability of making an
appropriate decision during contingencies. Following the work in [64, 1], in earlier
work, we have developed a model to map the operators’ error probability with
the grid states of the Markov chain [88]. First, the model finds the human-error
probability (HEP) as a function of operators’ performance shaping factors (PSFs),
and the grid operating conditions, such as available time, complexity, and human
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performance attributes, e.g., stress, training, and working environment. Then, a
mapping between grid conditions and operator response levels is established utilizing the probability distribution of the PSF levels. The mapping is established
based on a histogram-equalization principle, assuming a monotone relationship
between the HEP values and the number of line failures. We show a summarized
flowchart of the steps used to map the operators’ error probability with the state
variables of the Markov chain in Figure 4.9 (discussed in chapter 3). Three realizations (representing nominal, medium, and extreme PSF values from [64]) of the
system operator’s error probability against the indexes of the state are plotted in
Figure 4.10. Note that for nominal PSFs, the human error probability is mostly
zero as opposed to one for extreme along with the index of the state. For the
medium PSFs, the error probability monotonically increases to one with the state
index. Depending on the independent PSF factors, the human error probability
plot varies between nominal and extreme scenarios along with the state index.
Note that Wang et al. used a separate state variable for human factors [1]. The
benefit of using the proposed mapping is that the operator’s error probability can
be calculated as a function of the state variables of the Markov chain. So, the
need for a human factor state variable is redundant, which ensures a significant
reduction in the state-space of the transition matrix. The operators’ error probability affects the transition probabilities of the Markov chain through the load
shedding constraint.
Influence of cyber threat on the reliability of the power grid
A major enhancement of our proposed model compared to the existing model is
its capability to capture the dynamics of cyber threats. The single giant network
made of the power grid and the associated communication network makes the entire network susceptible to cyber attacks. Attackers can use the communication
network as a medium to get into the grid network and eventually initiate cascad-
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Figure 4.10: Human error probability mapped with state indexes of the Markov
chain for various operators’ PSFs
.
ing failures by manipulating data, false data injection, and changing the system
parameters. Increasing k would increase communication capability in the grid
but, at the same time, increase the risk of cyberattacks. To capture this critical
attribute of the grid, we introduce the state variable Ψ, which can be categorized
to indicate the various cyber threat profile for the grid. For example, we consider three distinct cyber threat level,Ψ ∈ [Ψ1 , Ψ2 , Ψ3 ] in this work to capture the
scenarios from low, medium and high cyber risk. Monotone cyber transitions are
considered in this work, i.e., with more transmission line failures, cyber transitions
from low to high are considered not vice versa.
4.3.3

Transition matrix of the Markov chain

The transition matrix of the Markov-chain developed following the approach
in [5, 1]. The state-space of the Markov chain is a 2M |C||Ψ| × 2M |C||Ψ| matrix. In the subsequent calculations we consider |C| = 5 and |Ψ| = 3 i.e., five
types of transmission line capacities and three levels of cyber threat (low, medium
and high).In our model, we did not consider any healing of the failed lines during the propagation of cascading failures, i.e., the number of failed lines increases
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Figure 4.11: Schematic diagram of the state transitions of the Markov chain
monotonically until it reaches to an absorbing state. There are three types of
transitions allowed in the Markov chain, from a transitory state to another transitory state with the same capacity, higher capacity, or an absorbing state. We
show the various types of transitions of the Markov chain using figure 4.11. When
an absorbing state is reached, cascading failures end for that iteration. For transitioning between transitory states, we allow one additional failure per unit time,
i.e., from Fi toFi + 1 there are |C||Ψ| possible transitions within the Markov chain.
Due to the monotonic assumption of the line failures, the transition matrix P is
a row-stochastic upper diagonal matrix. The transition probabilities from state
Si = (Fi , Cimax , Ψi , Ii ) to state Sj = (Fj , Cjmax , Ψj , Ij ), is given below:
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f (Sj |Si ) =





1 if Fj = Fi , Cjmax = Cimax , Ψj = Ψi ,








Ij = Ii = 1,








Pstop (Si )







 if F = F , C max = C max , Ψ = Ψ ,
j

i

j

j

i

i

(4.14)




Ij = 1, Ii = 0,








P (Sj |Si ) if Fj = Fi + 1, Cjmax ∈ C,








Ψj ∈ Ψ, Ij = 0,







0
otherwise.
Here Pstop (Si ) and P (Sj |Si ) represents the probability of cascade stop at state
Si and cascade to continue at state Sj from Si respectively and M is the total
number of transmission lines in the grid. We refine Pstop (Si ) from [5] as follows to
include the effect of cyber threat:
max) 

Pstop (Si ) = wPstop (Fi ) + (1 − w)Pstop (Ci

(1 − kφi (Ψi ))

(4.15)

Here φi (Ψi ) represents cyber threat probability for any given state and is defined
as follows:


exp(γlFi ) − 1
φi (Ψi ) = λk 1 −
,
max ) − 1
exp(γNpc

(4.16)

Note that the term 1 − kφi (Ψi ) is high when k is low indicating cyber threat
has low effect on cascade stop probability and cascading failures. On the contrary,
When k is high, 1 − kφi (Ψi ) is low , which indicates that higher inter-connectivity
yields higher probability of cyber threat that reduces the probability of cascade
stopping. Again, in both cases, 1 − kφi (Ψi ) decreases from k to zero for zero
line failures to complete blackout respectively indicating that line failures fails
power-communication inter-connectivity, which in turn reduces the cyber-threat
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probability. The other term in Pstop (Si ), which is a linear combination of state variables Fi and Cimax is adopted from [5], where Pstop (Fi ) and Pstop (Cimax represents
the probability of cascade stop with Fi failures and capacity Cimax respectively.
The formulations were developed based on extensive cascading failure simulations
over the IEEE 118 bus grid. Note that Pstop (Fi ) has a bowl-shape pattern defining
three phases of a cascading failure and Pstop (Ci ) has an exponentially decreasing
pattern that is high (low) when the maximum capacity of the failed transmission
line is low (high).

Pstop (Fi ) =




−Fi

a1 ( a2aM2 M
)+





if 1 ≤ Fi ≤ a2 M,
(4.17)

 if a2 M < Fi ≤ 0.6M,






Q(Fi ) if 0.6M < Fi ≤ M,
(

Pstop (Ci ) = max a3

 max{C} − C max 4
i

max{C}

)
, a4 .

(4.18)

The parameters a1 , a2 ,a3 , a4 ,  defines the shape of the cascade stop probability.
Parametric relationships between the parameters and the operating parameters of
the grid were established in [1]. In both [5, 1], a fixed load-shedding constraint
parameter, θ ∈ [0,1] was considered, which is the ratio of loads where load shedding is restricted and the total load of the grid. Intuitively, the constraint of load
shedding is negatively correlated with the level of inter-connectivity, i.e., increasing the level of interconnectivity increases the availability of information, which
in turn decreases the constraint on load shedding. With power node failures, the
corresponding interconnection is also lost, which increases the constraint on implemented load-shedding in the grid. To capture this dynamical behavior, we differ
from fixed θ in [5] and define θ as
In the proposed model, we consider load shedding as a dynamic parameter that
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depends on three components: the level of inter-connectivity, system operators’
error probability, and the number of line failures. We define load shedding, θ for
any state as follows:

θ = min(1, HEP(Fi , Cimax , Ψi ) + 1 − k +

klF 
,
max
Npc

(4.19)

The parameters a1 , a2 , and a3 , a4 are kept as same as defined in (4.6) - (4.8)
and (4.10) - (4.11) respectively.
In equation 4.19, l = N/M, where N is the number of power nodes (buses) and
M is the number of transmission lines. Transition probabilities, P (Sj |Si ) of the
Markov chain, are calculated as follows:

P (Sj |Si ) =



u(Ψj )


Pcont (Si )(1 − Phc (Si )) P

u(Ψl )

l:Ψ
l ≥Ψl





 if Cjmax = Cimax ,

w(Cjmax )
u(Ψj )

P
P

P
(S
)P
(S
)
cont
i
hc
i


m:Cm >C max w(Cm )
l:Ψl ≥Ψl u(Ψl )

i





if Cjmax > Cimax ,

(4.20)

where Pcont (Si ) = 1 − Pstop (Si ) and


Phc (Si ) = min 1, α(Fi + β)3 ,

(4.21)

where α and β are constants. Moreover, Phc (Si ) is the transition probability
to a state with higher capacity and the w(Ck )’s are capacity weight parameters
calculated from power grid simulations in [5] . We adopt the formulation of the
human-error probability from [88] and ψi using (3), and after each failure in the
power grid, we update the parameter θi parameter using 4.19.
Now, for any given initial condition, we can calculate the limiting distribution
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of the failed transmission lines for a given initial state. Let, π 0 be a vector that
denotes the initial state S0 of the Markov chain. Next, let the vector π (S0 ) =
(S0 )

(πi

, i = 1, ..., 2M |C||Ψ|) represents the limiting distribution of the Markov chain
(S0 )

starting from the state S0 , where πi

is the steady-state probability of the state

Si . Hence, π (S0 ) = π 0 lim Pk . The conditional probability that a power grid
k→∞

eventually reaches a steady-state with Fi failures from an initial state S0 is defined
as

|C||Ψ|

p(Fi |S0 ) =

X

(S )

π2(F0 i −1)|C||Ψ|+2n .

(4.22)

n=1

For a more detailed understanding regarding cumulative transmission-line failure probability and blackout size, we refer the reader to [5]. Using the distribution
of blackout sizes, we can calculate the expected number of transmission-line failures, E[Fi |S0 ], given the initial condition, S0 as follows,

E[Fi |S0 ] =

M
X

Fi p(Fi |S0 ).

(4.23)

Fi =1

4.4 Results

In this section, we share the capabilities of the I-SASE model using the IEEE
188-bus topology used in [5]. Since the SASE [5] and hSASE [1] models are already
validated using power grid simulations over IEEE 118 and IEEE300 bus test cases
and published in IEEE transactions on power systems previously, in this work we
do not show additional validation to save space. For validation of the original
SASE model, interested readers are suggested to read [5]. However, a comparison
between the proposed model with a SASE and hSASE model is shown here to share
the dissimilarities between observed outcomes along with additional capabilities.

average transmission line failures
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Figure 4.12: Expected transmission line failures for various inter-connectivity, and
cyber threat level. We considered Fi =2, C max =20, r =0.7, e=0.1 and nominal
human error level. We can observe a point of diminishing return when cyber
threat is considered.

4.4.1

Optimal power-communication inter-connectivity

One benefit of the proposed I-SASE model compared to the existing literature
is that it finds an optimal level of inter-connectivity between the power grid and
the associated communication network given human error probability and level
of cyber threat. We use the expected value of transmission line failures as a
measure of grid reliability, which can be calculated using equation (14). Increasing
interconnectivity reduces constraint on load shedding but increases cyber threat
probability. Thus, Due to the convex nature of the problem, there exists an optimal
inter-connectivity that minimizes E[Fi |S0 ] subject to 0 ≤ θ, Ψ, HEP ≤ 1 and for
a given grid condition during cascade initiation. Again, increasing the number
of transmission line failures reduces inter-connectivity, which in turn, increases
load shedding constraint, system operators’ error probability but reduces cyber
threat. Initially, increasing the level of inter-connectivity reduces the constraint
on load shedding, which reduces the expected value of transmission line failures.
As we increase inter-connectivity, cyber threat starts to play its role, and there
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Figure 4.13: Distribution of the blackout size given initial condition of the grid
for various nominal and extreme system operator error scenario,. We considered
Fi =2, Cimax =20, Ψ=1, r =0.7, e=0.1
exists a point of diminishing return beyond which the cyber threat dominates over
capability to implement load shedding. We plot the E[Fi |S0 ] against the various
level of inter-connectivity for different cyber threat level in Figure 5. Here we also
plotted E[Fi |S0 ] when the cyber-threat probability is zero, i.e., without considering
any cyber threat (marked by the red line). Notice that when cyber threat is not
considered, increasing inter-connectivity decreases E[Fi |S0 ], and the optimal value
of inter-connectivity is one, which matches the observed behavior in [7]. When
cyber threat and nominal system operator error probability is considered, for the
chosen initial condition (Fi =2, Cimax =20, r =0.7, e=0.1), we observed optimal
inter-connectivity at 80%.
4.4.2

Comparison with similar models

Recall that our proposed model is a generalization of the SASE model in [5].
Thus, if we exclude the effect of cyber threat and system operator errors, the model
collapses to the SASE model. In that case, θ is a fixed parameter and does not
change with the dynamics of the power grid. We have plotted E[Fi |S0 ] calculated
using SASE model against the various level of inter-connectivity in Figure 4.12.
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Note that when SASE model is considered (without cyber threat and operators’
error), inter-connectivity level and load shedding constraint parameters are fully
correlated. We can observe in Figure 4.12 that when inter-connectivity level is
high, the line plots for SASE (purple) and without cyber threat (red) is a close
match but not for when inter-connectivity level is low. The reason for this is that,
for without cyber threat (red) case, system operators’ error is considered, which
created the difference between the two plots. However, when inter-connectivity
level is high, load shedding capability increases significantly which supersedes the
effect of operator error.
4.4.3

System operators’ role on cascading failure

Recall that in Figure 4.10, we plotted operators’ error probability against state
indexes, which is monotone in nature. Error in operators’ decision-taking adds
more constraint on load shedding capability, which reduces the probability of cascade stopping and hence increases E[Fi |S0 ]. The effect of various operator performance scenarios can be visualized in Figure 4.13. We observe that an exponential
distribution for nominal HEP during a heavy tail distribution of extreme HEP.
4.5 Summary of this chapter

In this chapter, a cyber threat and system operator error aware Markov chain
based model is presented for analytically predicting cascading failures in the power
grid. Such a model is a significant enhancement and more realistic compared to
the existing models for analyzing cascading failures probabilistically. During the
propagation of cascading failures, the capability of the system operators, and
the reliability of the available information can impact the dynamics of cascading failures significantly, which has been captured effectively in this model. Both
benefits and harm of interdependency between power grid layers were captured
through the dynamic load-shedding parameter and the cyber threat variable. Sys-

102

tem operators’ error in taking the right actions at the right time was captured
through load shedding constraints. Using this I-SASE model, statistics such as
the distribution of transmission line failures conditional on initial condition in the
steady-state, Expected values of the transmission line failures can be predicted,
which can be useful to utilities for designing the grid. Additionally, an optimal
power-communication inter-connectivity level given initial conditions of the grid
can be calculated, which also can be a useful measure of reliability for the grid.
One drawback of the model is that due to the unavailability of full grid network
simulation data, the analytical model for cyber threat transitions could not be
calculated analytically. Future efforts in validating the model in a live testbed
would be crucial before implementing the model in a live grid network.
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Chapter 5
Dynamics of Transmission Capacity and Load Loss during Cascading Failures in Power Grids

In this chapter, an analytical model is proposed to predict the average transmissioncapacity loss and load loss during a cascading failure as a function of time and
their steady-state values. Cascading failures in the power grid are described using
a Markov-chain approach, in which the state transition probabilities depend on the
number and capacities of the failed lines. The transition matrix is characterized
parametrically using Monte Carlo simulations of cascading failures in the power
grid. The severity of cascading failure is estimated using two metrics: the expected number of transmission-line failures and the amount of load shedding/load
loss (inferred from the average transmission capacity loss) in the steady-state.
These two metrics provide critical information regarding the severity of a cascading failure in a power grid (in terms of both the distribution of blackout sizes and
the amounts of load shedding). One of the benefits of this model is that it enables
the understanding of the effect of initial failures and the operating parameters of
the power grid on cascading failures.
5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we propose a model based on a Markov-chain to characterize
the dynamics of cascading failures and calculate the severity of a cascade using twowidely used metrics, i.e., the number of failed transmission-lines and the amount
of load shedding/load loss (calculated from the average transmission capacity loss)
during cascading failures.
The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, we construct the transition
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matrix of the reduced state space using a realistic setting derived from power flow
simulations using MATPOWER [79]. While in the SASE model [5], the allowed
transitions in the next state were either to the same capacity or to a higher capacity of the transmission lines, here we consider transitions to any capacity in
the next state. As a result, the calculation of the steady-state probabilities is
more detailed compared to the SASE model. Second, our approach of calculating
the transition matrix allows us to calculate the average transmission capacity loss
(ATCL) by using a recursion technique. Third, we use numerical simulations to
show that there is a linear correlation between the amount of load shedding and
the cumulative capacity of the failed transmission lines during cascading failures.
Hence, by using linear regression, we can infer the amount of load shed from an analytical calculation of ATCL. Most probabilistic models consider the distribution
of the transmission-line failures as a metric of severity [13]. Using our model, we
obtain the distribution of the blackout size and calculate the amount of load loss,
which has been identified as the two critical metrics for evaluating the severity of
a cascade in [58]. We name this model cSASE (capacity-SASE) to emphasize its
predictive capability of tracking ATCL loss during a cascading failure.
5.2 cSASE model

5.2.1

Review of the simulation framework

The cSASE model is driven by numerous cascading failure simulations performed on the IEEE 118-bus system to understand cascading failure behavior.
We use MATPOWER, a package of MATLAB, which provides a solution to the
steady-state DC power-flow optimization problem. MATPOWER [79] has been
used in several previous works [5, 1, 32] to analyze cascading failures in power
grids. Most of the state-of-the-art probabilistic models on cascading failures use
the DC power flow model for its simplicity yet effectiveness [29, 7].
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In what follows, we consider a failure of a transmission line occurs when the
power flow through the transmission line exceeds the maximum allowable powerflow limit of that transmission line. This maximum allowable power-flow limit is
the capacity of that particular transmission line. Once the flow on a transmission
line exceeds the capacity, we fail that line and re-calculate the power-flow again
using the remaining transmission lines and repeat this process until we find no
overloaded transmission lines. In our simulations, we consider one transmissionline failure occurs at each unit time. If multiple transmission lines exceed the
capacity threshold, we fail the line with the maximum deviation from the overflow
threshold. Since the power grid needs to balance generation and load, the failure of
the overloaded transmission lines can lead to a cascade of failures in the successive
time steps. To provide further context, similar to [5], we consider three powergrid operating parameters. Namely, we define the power grid loading level, r ∈
[0,1], as the ratio of the total load demand and the total generation capacity.
The load-shedding constraint θ ∈ [0, 1] is defined as the ratio between the total
uncontrollable load (loads that do not participate in load shedding) and the total
load in the power grid. The capacity estimation error, e ∈ [0, 0.5], quantifies the
error by the control center in estimating the actual capacity of the lines. Note that
simulation results show that transmission-line failures increase with the r, e, and θ
parameters. Further, in our simulations, in addition to variations and randomness
in the initial failure, hidden failures are modeled by adding a small probability
of failure for the lines adjacent to failed lines. From the simulations, we observe
that depending on the grid topology, power grid operating parameters, and initial
disturbances, the severity of the cascading failure varies from no cascading failures
to complete power grid blackouts (a blackout occurs when a significant portion of
the grid is failed).
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5.2.2

State variables of the Markov chain

The state of the cSASE model is defined as Si = (Fi , Ci , Ii ), where Fi , Ci , Ii are
the state variables of the Markov chain. Here, Fi is the number of transmissionline failures at state Si . To stay consistent with the simulation, we allow one
transmission-line failure in our Markov chain at a time, which corresponds to setting a time step as the time needed for only one line failure to occur. Ci represents
the capacity of the latest failed transmission line. Based on the simulation, we
group the IEEE 118-bus system into 5 possible power-flow capacities; namely, C
={20MW, 60MW, 120MW, 200MW, 332MW} representing the quantized powerflow capacities based on transmission line) associated with the 186 transmission
lines of the IEEE 118-bus topology. For a different topology, the set of power
flow capacities may be different in size and contain different values. When a new
transmission line fails at state Sj , the capacity of that line would be Cj ∈ C. To
capture this phenomenon, we consider every possible one-step transition in the
transition matrix from the previous state. Hence the main difference with the
SASE model is that we keep track of the capacities of the lines that fail at any
time, instead of the maximum capacity of the failed lines up to that point.
5.2.3

Formulating the transition matrix

The transition matrix of the Markov chain is a 2M |C| × 2M |C| matrix, where
M is the total number of transmission lines and |C| is the cardinality of the set
of capacities (five in this work) and 2 accounts for the binary variable I. In our
model, we do not allow failed lines to recover. So, the number of transmission-line
failure, Fi , increases monotonically at a rate of one failure per unit time. Since, Fi
increases monotonically with no healing capabilities, the transition matrix P is a
row-stochastic upper diagonal matrix. The state transition probability, f (Sj |Si ),
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from state Si = (Fi , Ci , Ii ) to the next state Sj = (Fj , Cj , Ij ), is defined below

f (Sj |Si ) =





1
if Fj = Fi , Cj = Ci , Ij = Ii = 1,







Pstop (Si ) if Fj = Fi , Cj = Ci , Ij = 1,

(5.1)




P (Sj |Si ) if Fj = Fi + 1, Cj ∈ C, Ij = 0,







0
otherwise.
Here, Pstop (Si ) is the probability of the cascading stopping at state Si , and
P (Sj |Si ) is the probability of a new transmission-line failure with capacity Cj given
the Fi transmission-line failures with latest capacity loss of Ci . We introduce the
marginal probability, PFCii , which is the probability of a transmission-line failure
with capacity Ci when the number of failed line is Fi . Based on our set of power
flow capacities C and power grid simulations with 5000 random simulations over
the IEEE 118-bus system, we obtain the following probabilities of transmission-line
failures: P120 = 0.898, P160 = 0.076, P1120 = 0.020, P1200 = 0.005, P1332 = 0.001. We
use this set of marginal probabilities as the initial input to our model. Consider an
initial event with one or more transmission-line failures, i.e., with a known Fi and
Ci . A cascading failure stops when the Markov chain reaches an absorbing state
(no additional failures), i.e., for a state with Pstop (Si ) = 1. Note that, Pstop (Si ) is
a key parameter of the Markov chain model and the characterization of Pstop (Si )
was discussed extensively in [5].
Here, Pstop (Si ) is defined as a linear combination of Pstop (Fi ) (the probability of
cascade-stop with Fi failures) and Pstop (Ci ) (the probability of cascade-stop with
capacity Ci ). We adopt the formulation of Pstop (Fi ) from [5]. However, powergrid simulations show that Pstop (Ci ) is high (low) when the capacity of the failed
transmission line is low (high). Hence, Pstop (Ci ) is defined as
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Table 5.1: α, β, γ for different values of Fi , r, e, θ
Fi
2
2
3
3
4
5

r
0.7
0.85
0.6
0.85
0.85
0.85

e
0.4
0.45
0.3
0.45
0.45
0.45

θ
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2

α
44.33
4159.02
2919.47
2167.98
2048.77
1620.52

β
-1.37
-2.84
-2.69
-2.63
-2.60
-2.51

γ
-1.19e-05
-1.95e-05
-1.08e-05
-2.32e-05
-1.44e-05
-7.2e-06

(

)
 C − max{C} 4
i
Pstop (Ci ) = max a3
, a4 .
max{C}

(5.2)

Here a3 and a4 are scaling parameters for Pstop (Ci ) in addition to a1 and a2 for
Pstop (Fi ), which are modeled parametrically using power grid simulations [5].
We formulate P (Sj |Si ) using Pstop (Si ) (defined above) as




β
P (Sj |Si ) = α(Cj ) 1 + γCi (Cj − Cth )
1 − Pstop (Si ) .

(5.3)

The parameters α, β, γ and Cth are calculated as done in [89]. Here, Cth is a
threshold in capacity values, where transmission lines with capacity lower than Cth
are more vulnerable to failure in the next step. For the chosen set of capacities,
a value of Cth = 41MW was observed from power grid simulations similar to [89].
For reproducibility, we list the values of α, β, γ calculated from the fitted power
grid simulation data for different values of r, e, θ and initial Fi in Table 1. This
completes the calculation of f (Sj |Si ) in (1) for all Si , Sj .
5.2.4

Calculating the average transmission capacity loss in the steady
state

ATCL is a piece of critical information for measuring the severity of the cascading failure and regarding the reliability of the power grid. NERC defines a large
cascading failure that occurs in the power grid when the total load loss exceeds
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300MW[32]. Next, we define our approach of calculating the ATCL, which will
allow us to calculate the load loss during cascading failure.
We introduce the following recursion to calculate the average transmission
capacity loss during cascading failures in the power grid as

AT CFj = AT CFi + ACLFj ,

(5.4)

where ACLFi is the ATCL in the current state with Fi failures, and AT CFj is
the average total capacity (ATC) loss with a total of Fj failures during cascading
failures. To calculate ACLFj , we need the marginal probabilities of initial linefailures with capacity Ci at the current state. After the occurrence of an initial
event, we calculate the marginal probability at successive steps as follows,

C

PFjj =

X

P (Cj | Ci )P (Ci ),

(5.5)

Ci ∈C

where P (Cj |Ci ) = P (Sj |Si ) is obtained using (5). Here, P (Cj |Ci ) equals P (Sj |Si )
because of our definition of the transition matrix in (1). Note that, P (Cj |Ci )
depends on the particular bowl shape of Pstop (Si ) and varies with Fi and Ci .
Then, we calculate ACLFj as follows

ACLFj =

X

C

Cj PFjj .

(5.6)

Cj ∈C

Now, for any given initial condition, we can calculate the distribution of the
failed transmission lines for various operating conditions (r, e, θ) of the power grid.
Let, π 0 be a vector that denotes the initial state S0 at time k = 0. Then π =
π i , (i = 1, ..., 2M |C|) represents the limiting distribution, i.e., π i = π 0 lim Pk .
k→∞

The conditional probability that a power grid eventually reaches a state with Fi
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(a) Number of line failure

(b) Transmission capacity loss

Figure 5.1: Expected number of line failure and expected transmission capacity
loss for different total number of transmission lines M and initially failed transmission lines F . Here, Ci is the capacity of the latest transmission line failed among
F transmission lines and r = 0.85, e = 0.45, θ = 0.2.
failures from an initial state S0 , is defined as

p(Fi |S0 ) =

|C|
X

π2(Fi −1)|C|+2i .

(5.7)

i=1

For a more detailed understanding regarding cumulative transmission-line failure probability and blackout size, we refer the reader to [5]. We then calculate the
expected number of transmission-line failures, E[Fi |S0 ], given the initial condition,
S0 as follows,
E[Fi |S0 ] =

M
X

Fi p(Fi |S0 ).

(5.8)

Fi =1

Finally, we can calculate the expected total capacity loss for any given initial
condition, S0 , using

E[AT CFi |S0 ] =

M
X
Fi =1

AT CFi p(Fi |S0 ).

(5.9)
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5.3 Results

5.3.1

Expected number of transmission-line failures and average transmission capacity loss

In Figures 5.1(a) and 5.1(b), we show the trend of the expected number of
line failures and ATCL during a cascading failure for various initial conditions.
One great advantage of the SASE model is its scalability, and we can also scale
the cSASE model for any grid topology. We consider fixed α, β, γ, r, e, and θ
for the snapshots in Figures. 5.1(a) and 5.1(b). We increase the initial number
of failed transmission lines proportionally as we increase M . Figures 5.1(a) and
5.1(b) show the expected line failure and ATCL increase with an increase in F, Ci ,
and M . Similarly, we calculate the expected line failures using the SASE model.
The expected number of line failures in the SASE model is significantly high
compared to the cSASE model (for F = 4 and M = 200, expected line failure
is 26 in the SASE compared to 17 in the cSASE). The reason is that in the
SASE model, a transition to line failures with lower capacity in the Markov chain
state space is not allowed. Once a high-capacity transmission-line fails, there is
no transition to a low-capacity transmission line failure in the next step. In the
cSASE model, we allow all possible one-step transitions. Namely, even if there is
a high capacity transmission-line failure at the current state, a low capacity line
may fail at the next step. This difference causes the Pstop (Si )’s to be higher in the
cSASE compared to the SASE model.
5.3.2

Predicting load loss from average transmission capacity loss

We perform extensive cascading failure simulations on the IEEE 118-bus system using various power grid conditions. We randomly select the value of r from
the vector {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}, e randomly from the vector {0.05, 0.1, 0.15,
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0.2, 0.25}, θ randomly from the vector {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25}, and set Fi =2
for each iteration of the simulation. The purpose of taking vectors for different
operating parameters is to generate different combinations of initial operating conditions randomly with two transmission line failures. Note that, in simulation, we
use the DC optimal power flow algorithm, which is capable of implementing load
shedding based on the cost of generation and load. In the simulation, we set the
cost of load shedding ten times higher than the cost of generation. Similar to
[5], we use dispatchable loads in the MATPOWER solver. To do that, we add
additional buses to separate buses with both load and generation in the IEEE 118bus system and connect the new buses with the added negative generators that
result from the dispatchable load (two or more generators cannot be added in the
same bus in MATPOWER solver). As described earlier, we fail one transmission
line in each step of the cascade and redistribute the power flow. At the same
time, the MATPOWER solver implements load-shedding if required. We collect
measurement data containing cumulative transmission capacity of the failed lines
and the cumulative amount of load shed (load loss) from 76280 cascading failures
simulations from MATPOWER. Then, we calculate the average load shed for a
various cumulative capacity of the failed lines, which is plotted in Figure. 5.4.
Observe that the amount of load shed is linearly correlated with the cumulative
capacity of the failed transmission lines. The red line in Figure 5.2 shows the linear trend line calculated using linear regression with the slope coefficient and the
y-intercept being 0.1378 and - 33.461, respectively, for our data set. We see from
Figure 5.2 that the load shed variance is higher for the higher values of the cumulative capacity of the failed transmission lines due to low sample sizes for each bin.
The linear relationship between the amount of load shed and cumulative capacity
of the failed lines allows for a calculation of the amount of load shed from the
cumulative capacity of the failed transmission lines analytically. This observation

load shed (MW)
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Figure 5.2: Predicting average load shed from cumulative transmission capacity
of the failed transmission lines.

Figure 5.3: Expected transmission capacity loss during cascading failures for different M , F (red indicates a cascade). Here Ci = 20M W i, r = 0.85, e = 0.45,
and θ = 0.2.
is critical since the Markov chain simulation, and we obtain the ATCL for a given
initial condition. This allows us to use (i.e., the amount of load shed = 0.1378 ×
ATCL - 33.461) linear regression to get the amount of load shed from the ATCL.
5.3.3

Critical initial conditions for various grid sizes

We show the ATCL for various initial conditions (Ci = 20MW, r = 0.85, e =
0.45 and θ = 0.2) and number of transmission lines (F ) in Figure 5.3. We use
a threshold of 300MW for ATCL (which corresponds to a small amount of load
loss), above which we consider a cascading failure event. Note that the ATCL
value was chosen arbitrarily to classify cascade events. The table in Figure 5.3
shows the severity of cascading failure for different values of M and F (e.g., the
red-colored zones indicate a cascade). Observe that, when the total number of
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Figure 5.4: P (Fi ≥ 40) and ATCL for various r, e = 0.45, θ = 0.2. For r ≥ 0.65,
probability of a cascade increases with r.
transmission lines in the power grid M is 100, ATCL is less than 300MW only
for initial F = 2. Hence, when M ≤ 100, an initial failure with more than two
transmission-lines will lead to a cascading failure on average. On the other hand,
when M = 500, power-grids are resilient to cascading failures even though there
are five initial failures. Note that the results in Figure 5.3 are dependent on the
topology of the power grid.
In Figure 5.4a, we show show the cumulative probability of 40 or more transmissionline failures, P (Fi ≥ 40) for various r and in Figure 5.4b the average transmission
capacity loss for various r. Here the parameters a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 , α, β, and γ are approximated from power grid simulation data and curve fitting. Figure 5.4 shows
that the cumulative probability of 40 or more line failures increases sharply when
r > 0.65. ATCL also jumps from 184MW (r = 0.65) to 313MW (r = 0.7). This
indicates the critical load level for this particular setting. This critical load level is
critical in the cascading-failure analysis because beyond this level, failures follow
a power-law distribution rather than an exponential distribution. Thus the probability of having a large cascade is higher beyond this critical load level. Note that
this critical load level varies with the power grid topology as well as the values of
a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 , α, β, and γ, i.e., Pstop (Si ) and P (Sj |Si ).
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Chapter 6
Damage of initial assets can have different consequences

Cascading failures in the power grid are heavily dependent upon the initial
stressor event that induces failures in the power grid and initiates a chain of
events. A stressor event can be a natural disaster or human-made sabotage attack
or error. Power grid parameters such as the number of failed transmission lines,
the capacity of the failed transmission lines, the loading level in the power grid,
the ability to implement load-shedding, collectively affect the cascading behavior
following an initial event. Moreover, the geographical correlation among failures
during an initial event can amplify cascading failures [8, 90, 34]. A combination of
parameters determines the initial failures of the power grid due to the occurrence
of an initial stressor event and can lead to blackouts of various sizes in the power
grid. Therefore, to model the dynamics of the cascading failure in the power grid,
it is essential to investigate the impact of power grid parameter responses upon
an initial stressor event. In this chapter, we study the influence of the initial
conditions that conduce the cascading failures in the power grid. We formulate
the impact of stressor(s) events analytically using Gaussian, circular, and linear
degradation functions, which result in initial failures in the power grid. We perform simulations on the IEEE 118-bus and IEEE 300-bus topology using a power
flow simulator to observe the impact of initial stressor(s) event and power grid
parameters on cascading failures in the power grid. Simulations show that there
is a linear relationship between initial failures in the power grid and stressor(s)
intensity. Then, we observe the impact of the number of initially failed transmission lines and the total capacity of the initially failed transmission lines on
cascading failures in the power grid. Moreover, we use the power flow simulator
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Figure 6.1: Gaussian, circular and linear attacks mapped into a 2-D topological
space. Failures in the power grid depends on the intensity of the stressor(s). Initial
transmission line failures in the power grid calculated after an attack is simulated
[8].
to investigate the impact of power grid loading level and load-shedding during
the initial event. Our simulation results show that a combination of power grid
parameters influence cascading failures drastically. These parameters include the
number of failed transmission lines, the total capacity of the failed transmission
lines, number of geographical stressor(s) locations, failed transmission lines in each
stressor location, the intensity of the stressor(s), the power grid loading level, the
load-shedding constraints. Increasing the values of these parameters during an
initial event increases the probability of cascading, i.e., increases the probability
of blackout-size in the power grid. Simulation results suggest that the initial condition of the power grid during a stressor(s) event is very crucial; hence, this work
paves a way to study and minimize the impact of cascading failures with carefully
designing the grid considering these effects.
6.1 Modeling the initial failures due to the stressor(s) and impact of the stressor(s)
on cascading failures in power grid

In recent years, researchers contributed significantly to model the cascading
failures in the power grid. To the best of our knowledge, most of the works done
on the probabilistic modeling of cascading failures consider arbitrary initial failures
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and then focus on modeling the propagation of failures. However, fewer efforts
are made to observe the impact of various initial conditions that lead to cascading
failures, which is the crucial contribution of this chapter. We map the intensity of
stressor(s) events with failures in the power grid. No notable extensive analysis has
been done to show the correlation between the status of power-grid parameters
during an initial stressor(s) event and failures in the power grid that leads to
cascading failures. Our work can map the correlation between an initial stressor
event and cascading failures in the power grid; thus, this work can investigate the
cascading failure behavior of the power grid more realistically compared to other
works. In this section, we map the initial transmission line failures in the power
grid with stressor intensities.
6.1.1

Modeling the initial failures due to stressor(s)

Multiple stressors can occur in one geographical location, or they can spread
over different geographical areas. These stressor(s) events can range from natural
disasters (e.g., tornado, cyclone, earthquake) to intentional human-made attacks
(e.g., use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), High altitude electromagnetic pulses (HEMPs), cyber-attack in the communication layer of the power grid.
These events can lead to initial disturbances in the power grid, which may include
the transmission line failures, generator loss, or failures in the communication system. These initial failures can act as a trigger for initiating cascading failures
in the power grid. In this chapter, we have used spatially-homogeneous stressor(s) centers, which enables us to model multiple stressor(s) events at the same
time. The spread of these stressors can vary depending on the intensity of the
stressor(s). We use Gaussian, circular, and linear degradation functions, which
can reasonably characterize various real-world stressor(s) [8]. The intensity of the
Gaussian stressor degrades according to the Gaussian function as the spatial distance from the location of occurrence increases. The intensity of the function has
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(a) IEEE 118-bus topology

(b) IEEE 300-bus topology

Figure 6.2: IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus topology
a peak at the mean of the degradation function. Two parameters entirely describe
a circular degradation function: radius of the circle (r) and the intensity of the
stressor at the center (I). The main difference between a Gaussian and a circular
stressor is in their degradation function. For a Gaussian stressor, the intensity of
2

the stressor degrades at e−d , while for the circular stressor, it degrades with 1/d2 .
For the Gaussian case, d is the minimum distance from the stressor center to the
point where intensity needs to be measured (e.g., Bus location, transmission line
fault). Similarly, for the circular case, d is the distance from the stressor center
to the point of intensity measure. Linear stressor(s) can be used to model natural disasters like tornadoes, which can occur in any geographical location with a
shallow radius but having almost equal strength over the region it spreads. Figure
6.1 shows a realization of these three types of degradation functions over physical
infrastructure. Attacks with the same intensity can lead to a different impact on
the power grid (e.g., different transmission line failures) depending on the nature
of the attack.
We denote the stressor(s) event by W and the stressor intensity at any point
(xi , yi ) from the center of the stressor(s) with Iw (xi , yi ) ≥ 0 (attack intensity is
either zero or a positive number and cannot be negative). The shape of a stressor
can be either Gaussian, circular, linear, or a combination of any of these over the
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power grid topology. The stressor intensity degrades with distance from the center.
To calculate the probability of line failures due to a stressor event, we divide each
of the power grid transmission lines into N points (N can be infinity large, i.e.,
the distance between two adjacent points can be close to zero) and measure the
stressor intensity at those points after the occurrence of a stressor event. We then
take the maximum intensity calculated in those N points. We assume that if the
maximum intensity at any point over the line crosses a certain threshold, then the
line will fail. Here, we assume N to be sufficiently large. An alternative approach
to calculating the maximum stressor intensity on a transmission line can be to
calculate the minimum distance between the transmission line and the stressor
center. Since the stressor intensity degrades over distance, it is intuitive that
minimum distance from the stressor center would result in maximum intensity,
with the peak intensity being at the center of the stressor(s). Hence, the maximum
stressor intensity on a transmission line would be inversely proportional to the
minimum distance between the transmission line and the stressor center. For
a single stressor event occurred in a geographical location, we define the failure
probability of a transmission line as:
!
p((Bi , Bj )|W = w) = min

max Iw (xk , yk ), 1 ,

k∈1,...,N

(6.1)

where p((Bi , Bj )|W = w) denotes the failure probability of a transmission line of
the power grid, (Bi , Bj ) is the transmission line from Bi th bus to Bj th bus, and
(xk , yk ) is the location of the k th point on (Bi , Bj ). For multiple stressor events
occurring at the same time, the total stressor intensity at (xk , yk ) is


L
X
p((Bi , Bj )|W = (w1 , ..., wL )) = min (
max Iwi (xk , yk )), 1 ,
i=1

k∈1,...,N

(6.2)
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Figure 6.3: Average number of failed transmission lines in IEEE 118-bus topology
due to to Gaussian, circular and linear stressor(s) with various intensities.
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Figure 6.4: Average number of failed transmission lines in IEEE 300-bus topology
due to to Gaussian, circular and linear stressor(s) with various intensities.
where L denotes the number of stressors.
We calculate the total number of failed transmission lines in the power grid
due to the occurrence of the stressor(s) using the measured individual transmission
line probability. Similarly, we can calculate the bus (node) failure probability due
to multiple stressor events using the following equation.

L
X
p((Bi )|W = (w1 , ..., wL )) = min (
Iwi (xk , yk )), 1

(6.3)

i=1

Now, considering the fact that initial failures of a network component does
not depend on other components [90], the joint failure probability of the power
grid transmission lines due to stressor(s) event can be represented using the product of their individual failure probabilities. Therefore, for a power grid with M
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transmission lines we have


p ((B1 , B2 ), ..., (BM −1 , BM ))|W = w =

Y

p((Bi , Bj )|W = w),

(6.4)

(Bi ,Bj )∈V

where V is the collection of all transmission lines in the power grid. Depending on
the geographical position and the intensity of the stressor(s), we obtain different
initial transmission lines failures. Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 shows a plot of the
average number of failed transmission lines due to the stressor(s) with Gaussian,
circular, and linear degradation functions with various intensities. We obtain the
average number of failed transmission lines using Monte-Carlo simulations over the
IEEE 118-bus topology (186 transmission lines, Figure 6.2(a)) and IEEE 300-bus
topology (411 transmission lines, Figure 6.2(b)) with 1000 sample realizations. In
each sample realization, we generate stressor(s) at random locations (uniformly
distributed) and calculate the intensity of stressor at every bus and transmission
line using (6.1) and (6.2). Then we take the expectation of transmission line
failures over the total realizations with a stressor(s) intensity for the three degradation functions. In both IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus cases, we can see that the
expected number of failed transmission lines increases linearly with the increase in
stressor(s) intensity. Again, it can be observed that for a particular stressor type
and same attack intensity, for the IEEE 300-bus system, we get higher average
failed lines compared to the IEEE 118-bus system. Aforementioned is because,
for the IEEE 300-bus system, node density over the geographical region is higher
compared to the IEEE 118-bus system. From Figures 6.3 and 6.4, it is visible that
with the same stressor intensity, circular stressor creates the worst impact on both
the IEEE 118-bus and IEEE 300-bus topology. On the contrary, Gaussian stressor
has the least impact since Gaussian stressor(s) intensities decay at a faster rate
2

(e−d )compared to a circular stressor(s), which degrades with 1/d2 where d < r.
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As shown above, the expectation of transmission line failure in the power grid
has a linear relationship with stressor(s) intensities, i.e., the number of line failures
increases linearly with the stressor(s) intensity for Gaussian, circular and linear
degradation functions. With this relationship at hand, we now have a model that is
capable of giving the initial failures in a power grid due to a stressor(s) event with
various intensities. This is important because now we can predict the impact of
a real-world natural disaster or human-made attacks. In the next section, we will
use the obtained initial failures due to stressor(s) in optimal power flow simulator
(MATPOWER) [79] and analyze cascading failures in the power grid.
6.1.2

Simulation framework

We use the MATPOWER [79] based CFS framework in our cascading failures
analysis, which we described already in the previous chapters. It uses power-flow
distribution framework and can give overloaded transmission lines, which was used
in several previous works [84, 5, 1]. We consider a line failure when power flow
through a line exceeds maximum allowable capacity through that line. Once we
find an overflow in a transmission line, we fail that line and re-calculate optimal
power flow (OPF) using the remaining transmission lines. In our simulations, we
take one transmission line failure at a time. If multiple transmission lines exceed
the capacity threshold, we fail the line with maximum capacity. We take 1000
random realizations and calculate associated transmission line failure probabilities
due to the stressor(s) using (6.1) and (6.2). We use the same intensity of the
stressor(s) for one turn of 1000 realizations and calculate the average number of
failed transmission lines.
6.1.3

Impact of stressor(s) event on cascading failures

We use Gaussian, circular and linear stressor(s) over the IEEE 118-bus topology (Figure 6.2(a)), and consider these stressor(s) as initial events that may lead
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to cascading failures in the power grid. We only show the results using the IEEE
118-bus topology here for space constraint. We perform Monte-Carlo simulation to
analyze the impact of the stressor(s) on cascading failures in the power grid based
on OPF analysis. Since transmission line failures increase linearly with stressor
intensity, one stressor event can generate multiple transmission line failures if the
stressor intensity is high. However, the line failures will exhibit clustering (failed
lines will be close to each other). On the contrary, multiple stressors can initiate
multiple failures, and the stressor locations can be distributed randomly (inhibition). Here, we define that a cascading failure event occurred if more than five
percent additional transmission lines are failed after an initial stressor(s) event.
If, Fthreshold is the threshold for a cascading event, Finitial and M are the number
of initially failed transmission lines and total number of transmission lines respectively then, Fthreshold = Finitial + 0.05M . For a realization, if the total number of
line failure exceeds Fthreshold , we consider that as a cascading failure event. For
example, if three transmission line fails due to a stressor(s) event, then we say a
cascading failure event occurred if more than twelve transmission line fails for the
IEEE 118-bus case, which has 186 transmission lines. From Figure 6.5, it is visible
that inhibition of failures generates more cascading failure events than clustering,
i.e., if the transmission line failures are randomly distributed, then there is a higher
likelihood of cascading failures in the power grid. The reason for low cascading
due to clustering is that the power grid has a better control mechanism to mitigate
the impact of localized failures using load-shedding or islanding, as the location
of the failed lines is very close to each other. Most of the probabilistic models
consider random failures distributed over the power grid [5, 1, 7]. However, if the
failed transmission lines are distributed (can be the result from multiple stressor
events occurring at the same time in various locations), that in turn increases the
probability of cascading failure in the power grid.
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Figure 6.5: Number of failed transmission lines when one stressor location with
multiple failures (blue) and considering randomly distributed failed transmission
lines (green) where a stressor event contribute one transmission- line failure (we
pick the line with maximum intensity to fail).
Figure 6.6 shows the simulation result for attacks with multiple transmission
line failures. We can see that for the same number of transmission line failures, if
we increase the number of attack points, the power grid becomes more cascadeprone than the previous case. Here, in Figure 6.6, we use linear curve fitting (blue,
red, green, and orange lines represent various stressor(s)) to show the impact of
inhibition clearly.
6.2 Impact of initial failures due to a stressor event

We now apply our initial failure model in MATPOWER OPF simulator to
calculate the impact of stressor(s) events on cascading failures in the power grid.
Simulations using the other IEEE topologies follow the same pattern.
6.2.1

Impact of number of failed transmission lines and capacity of the
failed transmission lines

We define percentage of additional transmission lines lost due to the cascading
failures as ∆M /(M − Minitial ), where ∆M = additional transmission lines lost due
to cascading; M = total transmission lines of the power grid; Minitial = number
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Figure 6.6: Number of cascading failure event in a power grid with different number of attack points and number of transmission line failures.
of transmission lines failed due to initial event. Similarly, percentage of additional
capacity lost due to the cascading failures as ∆C /(Ctotal − Cinitial ), where ∆C =
additional capacity lost due to the cascading; Ctotal = total capacity of the power
grid; Cinitial = total capacity of the initially failed lines. Figure 6.7 represents
the impact of various initially failed transmission lines of fixed total capacity and
the total capacity of the failed transmission line during an initial event using
OPF simulations. In Figure 6.7(a), we keep the total capacity of the failed lines
as constant and then increase the number of failed transmission lines. We take
randomly distributed line failures for 1000 samples in each case. These initial
line failures are generated using random stressor events over the IEEE 118-bus
topology. Our simulation results suggest that if the total capacity of the failed
lines is fixed, an increase in the number of line failures makes the power grid
more cascade-prone. In Figure 6.7(b), a similar type of simulation is done with
a fixed number of failed transmission lines (randomly chosen from the 186 lines)
while varying the total capacity of the failed lines. The results suggest that the
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Figure 6.7: Relationship between the number of initially failed transmission line
due to a stressor event with a percentage of additionally failed lines due to cascading when the total capacity of the failed transmission lines are fixed, and the total
capacity of the initially failed transmission lines with additional capacity lost due
to cascading when the number of the failed transmission lines are fixed.
percentage of additional capacity lost due to cascading failures increases if the
total capacity of the initially failed lines is increased. Thus, we conclude that both
numbers of initial line failures and the total capacity of the failed lines during a
catastrophic event can lead to the cascading failures in the power grid.
6.2.2

Impact of power grid loading level and load-shedding constraint
on cascading failures in power grids

Power-grid loading level, l ∈ [0,1], is defined as the ratio of the total demand
and the generation capacity of the power grid. The ratio of the uncontrollable
loads (loads that do not participate in load shedding) and the total load in the
power grid is termed the load-shedding constraint, denoted by θ ∈ [0,1]. Here,
the stress of the power grid increases as we increase l, and θ = 0 implies no load
shedding constraint while θ = 1 indicates no load shedding can be implemented.
To observe the impact of l and θ, we consider a fixed number of initial transmission line failures in our simulation. We observe that when the power grid is
highly stressed, it is more cascade-prone than when the grid is nominally stressed.
Figure 6.8 shows a linear relationship between the average number of failed trans-
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Figure 6.8: Dependence of the average number of failed transmission lines on
power grid operating parameters ( l and θ).
mission lines and the operating parameters. We can also observe that there is a
critical operating point for both land θ (approximately 0.8 and 0.2 for l and θ in
our case). We observe a sharp increase in average cascading failures beyond this
critical parameter setting. Similar observations were found in [5, 1].
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Chapter 7
Predicting cascading failures in power grids using machine learning algorithms

Although there has been significant progress in modeling cascading failures in
power grids, few works involved using machine learning algorithms. In this chapter, we classify cascading failures in the power grid that lead to large blackouts in
power grids using machine learning algorithms. Since real-world cascading failure
data is not available, we create a synthetic cascading failure simulator framework
to generate cascading-failure data for various power grid operating parameters.
We include the topological parameters such as edge betweenness centrality, the
average shortest distance for various combinations of two transmission line failures in our dataset. Then we apply various machine learning algorithms to classify
cascading failures and compare accuracy. Further, we use regressive models to predict the number of failed transmission line and the amount of load shedding. This
data-driven technique is useful to quickly classify cascading failures based on the
input power grid conditions. Hence, power grid design engineers can use this to
increase the robustness of the grid.
In this chapter, we classify and predict cascading failure based on critical power
grid attributes like power-flow capacity, edge betweenness centrality, demand loss,
power grid loading, estimation errors, constraints on load-shedding. The contribution of this chapter is three-fold. First, we develop a cascading failure framework
(CFS) using MATPOWER [79], a widely used power-flow simulator and generate synthetic cascading failure data using the IEEE 118-bus topology. Second, a
comparison using different classifiers is shown to evaluate the classification performances. The objective is to do exploratory data analysis on labeled data using
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various supervised machine learning algorithms and identify the best algorithm
based on accuracy. Third, we use a linear regression technique to calculate the
number of transmission line failures, and the amount of load shed for any given
initial condition.
7.1 Power grid operating parameters and model features

Based on power grid simulations and prior works, we identify the following
power 49 grid operating parameters that govern the cascading failure dynamics. In
our simulation, we use the IEEE 118-bus system (which is a simple approximation
of the American Electric Power system (in the U.S. Midwest) [83]) as the test case
which contains 186 transmission lines, 118 buses (nodes) and 54 generators.
Power grid loading level, r: We define the power grid loading level, r ∈ [0, 1]
as the ratio of the total load demand, and the generation capacity of the power
grid. In the IEEE 118-bus system, the maximum generation is 9966MW. r = 1
indicates the demand is 9966MW and r ∈ [0, 1] scales the power demand with
respect to maximum possible generation. In our simulation, we define a vector
r = {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9} and simulate the grid against various r. Note that a
higher value of r increases the stress in the grid. We observe that for r < 0.5, the
power grid is under no stress and can absorb the impact of two transmission line
failures and redistribute the power flow without any further failures.
Load-shedding constraint, θ: The load-shedding constraint is defined as
the ratio of uncontrollable loads (loads that do not participate in load shedding)
and the total load in the power grid denoted by, θ ∈ [0, 1]. This is an important
parameter to ensure the control actions by the power grid operator. θ = 1 indicates
that all the loads are uncontrollable, and the human operators can perform no load
shedding. Again, θ = 0 indicates that the operators can shed any load on the grid.
In this chapter, we consider equal load shedding constraints over all the loads in
the grid. Further, we consider a vector θ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25} and choose
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Figure 7.1: Correlation among the features
value of θ randomly from the vector. Similar to r, a higher value of θ increases
the probability of cascading failure in the power grid.
Capacity estimation error, e: The Capacity estimation error, e ∈ [0, 0.25]
is defined as the error by the control center in its estimation of the actual capacity
of the lines. In our CFS framework, this parameter is used to calculate overloaded
lines. We used the same approach used in [5] to calculate overloaded lines. When
power flow in a transmission line exceeds (1-e)× capacity, we consider that line as
an overloaded line. We estimate the capacity of a transmission line using power
flow simulation under maximum loads, i.e., when generation equals demand (r=1).
Note that, since we use DC power flow simulation, there are no transient effects,
and we can use the maximum generation without any issues. We quantize the flow
capacity of a transmission line into a set of five capacities {20, 80, 200, 500, 800}
MW [81], and assign this capacity of the transmission line as a constraint of the
MATPOWER power flow optimization problem (discussed later). In this chapter,
we collect cascading failure data using various values of e.
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Fixed failure probability of neighboring lines, fp : To include the effect
of hidden failures and localized failures [13], we introduce a parameter namely, the
fixed failure probability of neighboring lines, fp in our CFS framework that fails
the first layer adjacent lines of a failed line with a small probability. We consider a
vector, fp = {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06} and choose the value of fp randomly
from that vector. Since this is a probability, it adds uncertainty on line failures,
i.e., the total number of transmission line failure after a cascading failure ends
is not deterministic for a given initial condition because this parameter ensures
that there is a small equal probability of adjacent line failures for any specific line
failures.
Edge betweenness, B and average shortest path, Sp : We keep track
of the average edge betweenness of the initially failed lines as a model feature,
which is defined as a measure of centrality based on shortest graph distance [91].
Since we are failing two transmission lines initially, we take the average of the
edge betweenness as a model feature. Additionally, we track the average shortest
path between two of the initially failed transmission lines as a model feature.
The shortest path is calculated using Dijkstra’s algorithm [91]. In this chapter,
to obtain the average shortest path between the two transmission lines, first, we
calculate the distance between two starting buses (from the bus) and the two
ending bus (to the bus) and then take the average distance between them. The
rationale for tracking these two features is to capture the role of power grid physical
topology, although, in [7], the authors mentioned that the role of power grid
topology in cascading failures in power grids is not explicit due to the dynamics
of power flow.
Flow capacity of the initially failed lines, Cf low : We keep track of the sum
of the flow capacities of the initially failed lines. Intuitively, failing transmission
lines with higher capacity yields more transmission line failures in the successive
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stages due to the sudden difference between load and generation.
Cumulative installed capacity of the failed lines, CCf ail : We keep track
of the cumulative installed capacity of the failed lines. Note that, installed capacity
of a transmission line the quantized capacity chosen from the set of five capacities.
Number of Islands, Nislands : Finally, we include the number of islands
formed due to cascading failures in power grids as model parameters. Since islands
are formed as a result of failures of transmission lines that breaks the power grid
into small self-sufficient microgrids, it is intuitive that the probability of a large
cascade is very high if the number of islands is very high.
On top of these features, we track the following two output labels.
Number of failed lines, Nf ail : We track the number of failed transmission
lines after the cascade ends as an output label. We classify the number of failed
lines, into three distinct classes (no, small, and large cascade) for classification.
Amount of Load shed, CLS: We use the optimal power flow algorithm
from MATPOWER, which includes the capability of implementing load shedding
depending on cost. In this work, we set the cost of load shedding ten times
higher than the cost of generation to ensure maximum generation before any load
shedding. We track the cumulative amount of load shedding as a critical grid
parameter.
In general, the stress of the power grid increases as we increase the operating
parameters. From the simulations, we observe that depending on the topology,
power grid operating parameters, and initial disturbances, the severity of the cascading failure varies from no cascading failure to a complete blackout of the power
grid. The correlation among the features is shown in Figure 7.1. Observe that the
correlation among the topological parameters B and Sp with the number of failed
lines and the amount of load shed is very less. The correlation plot is handy to
visualize the correlation between the features.
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of the overall accuracies for predicting cascading failure
in power grids using machine learning algorithms

7.2 Results

In this section, first, we discuss the statistics of the dataset and then implement
machine learning algorithms to predict cascading failures in power grids.
7.2.1

Description of the data

Based on our CFS framework, we have performed over seventy-six thousand
iterations using the IEEE 118-bus test case to collect synthetic data. In each
iteration, we randomly fail two transmission lines. We randomly select r, e, θ, pn
from the vectors defined earlier. We also calculate the topological parameters such
as edge betweenness centrality, shortest distance as defined. We store the power
flow through the initially failed transmission lines in a column. CFS framework
output provides us the number of transmission line failures after cascade ends, the
amount of load served, and load shed, number of islands formed, etc. We calculate
and store the input-output parameters for all the iterations.
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(a) no cascade

(b) small

(c) large cascade

Figure 7.3: Comparison of the accuracies for predicting cascading failure in power
grids using machine learning algorithms for the three classes of cascades.

7.2.2

Analysis on cascading failure prediction

We have used the dataset obtained from MATPOWER simulation to perform
classification using the python Scikit-learn library [92]. In the dataset, we contain
the number of transmission line failures after the cascade ends. As mentioned
above, we quantize the number of failed transmission lines in three classes: no
cascade(number of transmission lines failures ≤10), small cascade (10 <number
of transmission lines failures < 25), and large cascade (number of transmission
lines failures≥ 25). We split the dataset for training(70%) and testing(30%) purposes. We have used nine features, as described above. We have used the following
machine learning classification algorithms [93, 94]: logistic regression, k-nearest
neighbors (KNN), decision tree, random forest, support vector machine (SVM),
AdaBoost. The precision, recall, and f1-scores are calculated using [92] for all the
algorithms and shown in Figure 7.2. It can be observed that all the classification
algorithms have a relatively higher accuracy of classification with SVM and random forest having the best precision. Next, we show the individual cascade type
classification accuracies in Figure 7.3. We can observe that the classification of
no cascade has higher precision compared to the classification of high cascades.
This is because high cascades have low test samples compared to no cascades.
For KNN, we further calculate the optimal k that yields the lowest error rate and
observed that k = 9 gives the highest accuracy.
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Figure 7.4: Predicting the number of line failures using Linear Regression

Figure 7.5: Predicting the cumulative amount of load shed using Linear Regression

7.2.3

Linear regression to predict the number of transmission line failures and the amount of load shed

We then use linear regression [93] to predict the number of cascading failure
and the amount of load shed which is shown in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 respectively.
Observe that, the scatter plot of Figure 7.4 shows that the relationship between the
test data and the predicted values are linear, which indicates that linear regression
is a reasonable model to predict the number of line failures. The error(deviation)
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Table 7.1: Prediction error
Metric
mean absolute error
mean square error
root mean square error

Error (number
of failed lines)
1.9
7.07
2.66

Error (amount
of load shed)
82.92
15334.84
123.83

of the predicted values from the actual value is reported in Table 7.1. Note that
the error is relatively small. However, from Table 7.1, we also observe that the
error for predicting the amount of load-shed is relatively large. Also, in Figure 7.5,
it is visible that the plot is not linear, which indicates that linear regression is not
a good model for predicting the amount of load shedding. Note that, some of the
analytical models [5] also predicts the distribution of the number of line failures
from simulated data, while in our work, we only predict the number of line failures
and the amount of load shed from given data without finding the distribution of
the line failures.
7.3 Predicting cascading failures with a new dataset of modified features

We have used the before mentioned cascading failure simulation framework to
generate a new dataset with a modified feature. The rationale to generate the new
dataset with new features is to prune a few features from the previous dataset and
add a few new features to observe the performance. Here it is worth mentioning
that most of the features described above are engineered features calculated from
the regular features of the smart grid.
7.3.1

Features of the new data set

Following is a brief summary of the features of the new dataset:
Similar to the earlier work, We keep track of the Power grid loading level, r,
Load shedding constraint, θ, Capacity estimation error,e.
Failed lines, Cmax, Cmin, Installed capacity: We keep track of the initially
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Figure 7.6: box plot of the output variables with different r
failed lines, the maximum, minimum, and cumulative capacity of the initially
failed lines as features of the model.
Average degree, average distance: We track the average degree and distance of
the network after removing the initially failed lines as topological features of the
grid.
Human operator error probability: We use our work in [64] to calculate the
human operator error probability, randomly drawn from the distribution of the
operator attributes as a feature for the model.
Number of failed lines due to cascade: We track the number of failed transmission lines due to cascade after the cascade ends as an output label.
Amount of load shed: We use the optimal power flow algorithm from MATPOWER, which includes the capability of implementing load shedding depending
on the cost. Here, we set the cost of load shedding ten times higher than the cost
of generation to ensure maximum generation before any load shedding. We track
the cumulative amount of load shedding as a critical grid parameter.
From Figure 7.6, we can see that the number of failed lines almost remains the
same as the load increase. However, the amount of loadshed increases significantly,
which indicates that the additional load demand is mostly shaded, and fewer line
failures are triggered due to this additional load demand. To capture the effect
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Figure 7.7: Number of islands formed after the initial failures
of cascading failures (triggered by file failures and loadshed), we use the following
target variable. Cascading effect: We take the linear combination of the number
of failed lines and the amount of load-shed as the output variable we want to
predict. The variable is scaled between [0,1]. We use the variable values directly
for the regression task. For the classification task, we first calculate the median of
the cascading effect and sue the left half of the median as no cascade (class zero)
and the right half as cascade (class one) for classification.
7.3.2

Data cleaning

The dataset was mostly clean, but we checked the following steps to ensure
the cleanliness of the data.
• There are no missing values, null values, outliers in the dataset.
• We removed one duplicate column
• We renamed the columns for better understanding
We further checked the dataset with pandas info and describe the method and
found everything consistent.
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Figure 7.8: Histogram of the failed lines due to cascade

7.3.3

Statistical Analysis

We did statistical analysis such as colinearity analysis for pruning features, correlation analysis, histogram analysis for understanding the behavior of the dataset.
In figure 7.7, we show the number of islands triggered after the initial failed
lines of the grid. Since the number of islands triggered is very few, we did not
consider it as a feature.
From the histogram of the cascading effect in Figure 5, It can be observed
that the histogram is bimodal. The first pick indicates a zone where no additional
transmission liens were failed due to cascade, and no loads were shed, i.e., for the
set of feature values, no cascading occurred. Similarly, the second pick represents
that the average cascading effect occurred at 0.35.
The histogram of load-shedding in Figure 7.9 is slightly skewed to the left,
which is intuitive. This indicates the probability of a large cascading failure occurring is less. This also indicates that MATPOWER optimal power flow (OPF)
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Figure 7.9: Histogram of the load-shedding
is curtailing the loads efficiently to minimize the greater risk of a cascading failure.
From figure 7.10, we can visualize that there is no pattern of correlation between the cascading effect and installed (cumulative) capacity. Also, the installed
capacity is not a categorical value. Considering this, we remove this feature from
the dataset.
We did not consider generation, served load, and load demand as features of
the dataset to avoid collinearity, which can be visualized in Figure 7.11.
We plot the correlation among features in Figure 9. We can observe a strong
correlation between the cascading effect and Capacity estimation error. A moderate correlation between cascading effect and load-generation ratio, load-shedding
constraint, Human error probability, alpha(negative correlation). Low/minimal
Correlation between cascading effect and Cmax , Cmin , Degree, distance, and initially failed lines.
From Figure 7.13, the histogram of the cascading effect shows bimodal nature.
The first peak is due to no line failure scenarios, and the second peak captures the
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Figure 7.10: Cascading effect vs installed capacity

Figure 7.11: Generation and served load vs load shedding, demand vs r
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Figure 7.12: Correlation between features for the new dataset

Figure 7.13: Histogram of the cascading effect
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average effect of line failures and load shedding.
7.3.4

Results and In-depth analysis using machine learning

We have used the following algorithms for regression:
• Linear regression/ Ridge/Lasso regression
• Random Forest regression
• Support vector regressor
We have used the following algorithms for classification:
• Logistic regression
• KNN (k nearest neighbor)
• Random forest
• Decision tree
• Support vector machine
• Adaboost
The following metrics are used for evaluating the regression performance:
• r-squared score.
• mean absolute error (MAE)
• mean square error (MSE)
The following metrics are used for evaluating the classification performance:
• Accuracy
• Precision
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Figure 7.14: Steps used for modeling
• Recall
• F1-score
We show the steps used during the modeling phase in Figure 7.14
We split the data set for training (80%) and testing (20%) purposes. The precision, recall, and f1-scores are calculated using scikit-learn for all the algorithms
and shown in Figure 7.15. It can be observed that all the classification algorithms
have a relatively higher accuracy of classification with random forest having the
best accuracy. Next, we show the individual cascade class classification accuracies
in Fig. 12. The purpose of the classification task here is to find the boundary
between the cascade and no cascade zones for the given input space. Here also we
can see that random forest works best.
The hyperparameters used to get the best accuracy, precision, and recall are
given in Table 7.2.
For the regression task, we also obtained the best r-squared error using random
forest regression, which is shown in Figure 7.17. The mean squared error is also
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Figure 7.15: Classification accuracy

Figure 7.16: Classification accuracy for No cascade/cascade prediction

Table 7.2: Hyperparameters
Model
Decision tree
KNN
Adaboost
Random forest
Logistic regression
SVM

Hyperparameters
criterion: entropy, min samples leaf: 10,
min samples split: 5
algorithm: auto, leaf size: 1,
n neighbors: 10, weights: distance
algorithm: SAMME.R,
learning rate: 0.5, n estimators: 200
criterion: gini, min samples leaf: 5,
min samples split: 5, n estimators: 50
C: 10 (penalty =‘l2’)
C: 5, kernel: rbf
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Figure 7.17: Regression on cascading effect

Figure 7.18: Prediction and test data
reported.
Figure 7.18 represents the trend of the linear trend between predicted vs. test
values.
Comparing the performance of various models, we select a random forest model
for regression and classification tasks. Finally, we have generated 10000 data using
the cascading failure simulation framework for testing the model, and we have
achieved an 89% accuracy for classification and an r-squared score of 0.90.
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Chapter 8
Summary and future works

In this dissertation, a cyber threat and system operator error aware Markov
chain based model is presented for analytically predicting cascading failures in the
smart grid. Such a model is a significant enhancement and more realistic compared
to the existing models for analyzing cascading failures probabilistically. During
the propagation of cascading failures, the capability of the system operators, and
the reliability of the available information can impact the dynamics of cascading
failures significantly, which has been captured effectively in this model. Both benefits and harm of interdependency between power grid layers are captured through
the dynamic load-shedding parameter and the cyber threat variable. System operators’ error in taking the right actions at the right time is captured through load
shedding constraints. Using this I-SASE model, statistics such as the distribution
of transmission line failures conditional on initial condition in the steady-state, expected values of the transmission line failures can be predicted, which can be useful
to utilities for designing the grid. Additionally, an optimal power-communication
inter-connectivity level given initial conditions of the grid can be calculated, which
also can be a useful measure of reliability for the grid.
First, in chapter 2, we showed that while studying the cascading-failures in
power grids, it is very crucial to analyze the inter-dependency between power,
communication, and human interaction, compared to studying the single noninteracting power grid. We showed that the power grid can be negatively influenced when the power grid is under stress, when the human operator is stressed,
and when the communication system has failures. A combination of these interactive systems combined with power grid operating parameters can lead to
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catastrophic cascading-failures, which are not captured in non-interacting power
grid models. We showed that the blackout size in the power grid from a small
initial failure could be significantly impacted when the communication network
and control operation is not normal. We conclude that under nominal stress level,
power grid behaves as a reliable (follows exponential distribution) system during
cascading failure even with dependencies from human or communication network;
however, if we consider interdependencies from both communication and human
operators’ and increase stress level, power grid becomes unreliable (follows powerlaw distribution).
In chapter 3, we have refined a previously-reported Markov chain model to
enhance capturing the correlation between the operators’ performance attributes
with key grid-states, e.g., the number of failed transmission lines and the maximum capacity of the failed lines. The HEPs are determined from eight PSFs.
Next, the mapping is created to generate a HEP in terms of the grid states and
is embedded into the Markov chain transition matrix to capture the role of operator error using the distribution of the PSFs. Next, a set of critical PSF level
combinations are identified using the distribution of the PSF levels that have a
high probability of occurrence. Then, the blackout size, including the human error conditional on initial grid conditions, is estimated, and a comparison of results
with the existing hSASE model is shown. The use of the distribution of the PSFs
is that it allows the capture of the detailed role of the human operator into the
cascading failure dynamics. This work is valuable to understand the role of grid
operator performance and the impact of operators’ error on the reliability of smart
grids.
Then, in chapter 4, we present a stochastic Markov-chain based model (ISASE model) that captures the dynamics of cascading failures in the power grid,
including the role of power-communication interdependency and human operator
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error. The study of cascading-failure dynamics in a coupled environment, including power, communication, and human operator response, significantly enhances
the understanding of cascading-failure dynamics. A combination of these interactive layers, along with grid parameters, can lead to catastrophic cascading-failures
which are not captured in single-layered power grid models. The benefits of interdependency are captured by having a higher capability of implementing load shedding during contingencies. On the other hand, strong interdependency increases
the probability of cyber-attacks through communication channels and can affect
the operators’ decision-making capability. Particularly, with the I-SASE model,
one can calculate the probability distribution of the number of transmission-line
failures in the steady-state as well as can measure the effect of operator error on the
propagation of cascading failures. I-SASE model shows that for every fixed grid
operating conditions, there exists an optimal level of interdependency between the
power grid and the supporting communication infrastructure. The power grid becomes less resilient to contingencies above and under the optimal interdependency
as opposed to similar models that suggest that maximum power-communication
interdependency ensures maximum resilience to cascading failures.
In chapter 5, a novel way to calculate the average transmission capacity loss
(ATCL) analytically during a cascading failure is shown. The model captures the
distribution of the transmission-line failures at the steady-state as well as the total
transmission-capacity loss. We find a linear correlation between the cumulative
capacity of the failed transmission lines with the amount of load-shedding (load
loss) is shown. Our model is used to infer the amount of load shed from the
ATCL. The model incorporates some operational attributes of the power grid,
such as the ratio of the load and the total generation capacity, a constraint on
implementing load-shedding and error in estimating the true capacity flow in the
transmission lines, which makes the model useful from a practical perspective
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by power engineers. Notably, with this model, we can calculate the probability
distribution of the number of transmission-line failures and the total capacity
of the failed transmission lines as a function of time and at the steady-state.
This formulation allows us to identify the operating characteristics as well as the
initial conditions (initial line failures and their capacities) that result in cascading
failures.
In chapter 6, we analyze the impact of the initial stressor event that leads to
cascading failures. We have formulated the initial failures in the power grid with
various attack types (Gaussian, circular and linear) and simulate using IEEE 118bus and 300-bus topology. Our simulations suggest that the number of initially
failed transmission lines is linearly proportional to attack intensity. We observe
that cascading failures in the power grid are correlated with different power grid
parameters during an initial stressor(s) event. These parameters include transmission line failures, the capacity of the failed transmission lines, number of stressor
locations, power grid operating parameters such as power grid loading level, loadshedding constrain during an initial stressor event. All these initial conditions
eventually determine the blackout-size during a cascading event. Although several models can be found analyzing cascading failures in the power grid, most of
them consider arbitrary initial conditions to model the cascading failure behavior.
Our work captures the impact of initial conditions during a stressor(s) event and
analyzes cascading failures phenomenon from the stressor event that occurred.
Future works may include capturing the impact of continuous time-varying degradation functions and identify critical operating settings for the power grid for such
degradation functions.
In chapter 7, we have used machine learning algorithms to predict cascading
failures in power grids and also used linear regression to predict the number of
transmission line failures as well as the cumulative amount of load shedding given
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an initial operating condition. First, a CFS framework is developed, which enables
us to simulate cascading failure dynamics on the power grid under given initial
disturbances (i.e., transmission line failure) and power grid operating setting. Our
simulator is built over MATPOWER power flow simulations and runs on any standard IEEE test system case data. Our simulator can effectively generative labeled
cascading failure data set under different settings, which is used as an input to
machine learning models. Our results suggest that cascading failure prediction
can be made using machine learning with high accuracy. However, we showed a
simple exploratory data analysis in this work. Complex data-driven modeling to
find the distribution of line failures, distribution of load shedding, and critical line
identification is missing, which can be a valuable extension of this work. Further,
future works include extending the capability of the simulator to include generator
dynamics, AC power flow solver, including communication failures, human operator error so that analysis of frequency and transient instability can be analyzed,
and smart grid dynamics can be captured.
Future works on continuous improvements of the model and validation in a real
grid would be crucial. We have also developed a Markov decision process based
on optimal load-shedding policy using the SASE model for mitigating the risk of
cascading failures in our research group. Future works would include developing
the optimal load-shedding policy using the I-SASE model, capturing the human
operators’ error and cyber threat. We have used the D.C. optimal power-flow
model for calculating the transition probabilities of the Markov chain. Although
effective and widely adopted for modeling cascading failures, D.C power flow is a
simple approximation of the complex power flow dynamics and omits the effect of
transients. Validating the model using A.C. power flow and refining the transition
probability formulations to capture the transient effects can be scope for further
works in this direction. Further, we have not considered the role of distributed
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energy resources (DERs) such as wind farms, solar, and microgrids, as well as
operation and management systems. With the significant advent of renewable
energy resources in the smart grid, the operation and management of the grid is
becoming more and more complex. Inherent intermittent nature of the renewables
can significantly change the critical and non-critical operating points of the smart
grids. In addition, variable loads during a contingency was not captured in the
model. Hence, for completeness of the model, capturing the generator dynamics,
variable loads and the role of renewable energy resources into the model would
be a significant improvement on enhancing the capability of the model. Further,
the model is mainly developed to capture the interdependence between the power
grid and the associated communication network in smart grids. The model can be
generalized so that analysis of the interdependencies between any interdependent
networks (e.g., transportation networks) of any size can be done. One drawback
of the model is that due to the unavailability of full grid network simulation
data, the analytical model for cyber threat transitions could not be calculated
analytically. Also, the cyber security model approximated here is very naive.
Detailed modeling efforts are needed to understand the dynamics of cyber attacks
on cascading failures more precisely. Future efforts in validating the model in a
live testbed would be crucial before implementing the model in a live grid network.
Again, works can be done to Understand the role of cyber-threat awareness in the
decision process of system operators. With the advent of complex communication
capability, AI-based decision support tools are gaining more popularity primarily
due to the level of complex calculations and rule-based decisions it can manage
in no time to reduce human error. On the other hand, too much dependence on
AI-based tools would lead to a catastrophe in unforeseen events. A study is needs
to be done to find the optimal level of interaction between system operators and
the AI-based automated decision support systems.
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